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Abstract
The thesis develops a new theory of visuo-spatial mental imagery. The
theory is concretized in a formal framework and implemented as a compu-
tational model. The theory and its model are evaluated against a set of
empirical phenomena and compared to the contemporary theories of mental
imagery. The new theory is shown to provide explanations for the considered
phenomena that partly go beyond those of the contemporary theories.
The thesis is motivated by two main observations.
First, the observation that the lack of formalization of the current psy-
chological and philosophical theories of mental imagery limits the progress
of the imagery debate, i.e., the question about the nature of mental imagery.
A formalized theory is able to provide more detailed explanations and pre-
dictions for the empirical data which can facilitate further empirical studies.
Furthermore, sufficiently formalized theories become comparable with ob-
jective measures thus making similarities and differences between theories
more transparent.
Second, some of the contemporary theories of mental imagery stress the
involvement of rich mental representations in cognition and mental imagery.
This approach has been considered problematic with respect to more recent
results such as the functionality of eye movements during mental imagery
as well as the neuropsychological findings on unilateral neglect. The enac-
tive theory poses an exception and stresses the importance of sensorimotor
interactions for mental imagery.
The new theory shares assumptions with the enactive theory with re-
spect to direct and active vision and the relationship between vision and
imagery. It combines this view with grounded mental concepts which func-
tion as hubs to low-level perceptional actions. The theory understands the
process of mental imagery in the context of internal simulations of sensori-
motor interactions. Mental images are based on grounded concepts whose
semantics are made explicit by the overt and covert employment of the
low-level perceptual actions they link to. This employment of perceptual
actions makes low-level perceptual information available which represents
an instance of the conceptually described mental image. Critically, this per-
ceptual information is not made available by an activation of early visual
areas but by mechanisms of proprioception and anticipation.
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Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Dissertation entwickelt eine neue Theorie von ra¨umlich-
visueller mentaler Vorstellung. Diese Theorie wird formalisiert und als Com-
putermodell implementiert. Die Theorie und das Modell werden anhand
einer Menge von empirischen Pha¨nomenen evaluiert und mit den anderen
Theorien von mentaler Vorstellung verglichen. Es wird gezeigt, dass die
neue Theorie Erkla¨rungen fu¨r die Pha¨nomene bietet, welche zum Teil u¨ber
die Erkla¨rungen der anderen Theorien hinausgehen. Die Arbeit ist durch
zwei wesentliche Beobachtungen motiviert.
Dies ist erstens die Tatsache, dass die aktuellen psychologischen und
philosophischen Theorien nicht formal beschrieben sind. Diese Tatsache
limitiert den Fortschritt der sogenannten “imagery” Debatte. Diese Debatte
dreht sich um die Frage, wie menschliche Kognition mentale Vorstellung real-
isiert. Eine formale Theorie ist in der Lage empirische Daten detaillierter zu
erkla¨ren und Vorhersagen zu machen. Dies kann weitere empirische Unter-
suchungen theoretisch motivieren. Weiterhin sind formale Theorien objektiv
vergleichbar, so dass A¨hnlichkeiten und Unterschiede zwischen den Theo-
rien transparenter werden. Dadurch wird der wissenschaftliche Fortschritt
gefo¨rdert.
Zweitens stellen die meisten aktuellen Theorien die Rolle von mentalen
Repra¨sentationen fu¨r die Realisierung von Kognition und mentaler Vorstel-
lung in den Vordergrund. Die Erkla¨rungmo¨glichkeiten dieses Ansatzes wur-
den vor allem hinsichtlich neuerer Ergebnisse kritisch bewertet, z.B. die
Funktionalita¨t von Augenbewegungen wa¨hrend mentaler Vorstellung sowie
Ergebnisse aus der Neuropsychologie zu Aufmerksamkeitssto¨rungen. Die
“enactive” Theorie von mentaler Vorstellung stellt hierzu eine Ausnahme
dar, weil sie die Rolle von sensomotorischer Interaktion hervorhebt.
Die neue Theorie baut auf einigen der Annahmen der “enactive” The-
orie hinsichtlich aktiver und direkter Wahrnehmung und dem Verha¨ltnis
von Wahrnehmung und Vorstellung auf. Die Theorie kombiniert dies mit
geerdeten Symbolen (engl. grounded symbols) . Diese Symbole sind Assozi-
ationen mit bestimmten Aktionen der visuellen Wahrnehmung, z.B. Augen-
bewegungen. Die Theorie sieht mentale Vorstellungen vor dem Hintergrund
interner Simulationen von sensomotorischen Interaktionen. Mentale Bilder
basieren auf abstrakten Symbolen. Die Semantik dieser Symbole ergibt sich
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durch simulierte und tatsa¨chliche Ausfu¨hrung von Aktionen der visuellen
Wahrnehmung. Diese Ausfu¨hrung generiert eine konkrete perzeptuelle In-
stanz des, durch die Symbole konzeptuell beschriebenen, mentalen Bildes.
Diese perzeptuelle Instanz wird nicht durch die Aktivierung von Arealen des
visuellen Kortex generiert sondern durch Propriozeption und Antizipation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation – What is Mental Imagery?
What is mental imagery?
Mental imagery is one of those things that are easy to explain to a person,
but incredibly hard to scientifically grasp. How many windows does your
apartment or house have? Take your time to actually answer this question.
People usually report to solve this task by imagining themselves going
from room to room adding all the windows together. If you also did it
this way, then you just used mental imagery. Hearing a song play only in
your head, imagining how to find your way from A to B, imagining what
something or someone looks like, feels like, or tastes like; all that is also
considered mental imagery.
How our capability to imagine such things can be understood or how it
is realized has been a topic of philosophical and scientific discussion starting
at least as early as ancient greek philosophy1. After the decline of behavior-
ism during which mental imagery naturally received little to no attention,
it came back with a great impact on cognitive psychology with the first sur-
prising experimental results on mental rotation (Shepard & Metzler, 1971)
and later mental scanning (Kosslyn, 1973). Figure 1.1 depicts a set of stim-
uli from the mental rotation experiment. The task is to decide whether the
left shape is the same as the right one or whether it is a mirrored version
of it. The results showed that the response times are linearly proportional
to the angle of rotation between the two shapes. That is, the finding is
consistent with the assumption that one actually mentally rotates the shape
to see if it fits. Such an interpretation suggests that mental images might
have an uncanny structural similarity to the entities they represent, i.e., in
this case that the mental representation of the figure is mentally rotated
just like one would rotate an actual object. At the time of this study, these
1For a comprehensive overview on the history of the scientific and philosophical debate
on mental imagery up until today, see (Thomas, 2013)
15
Figure 1.1: Mental rotation stimuli from (Shepard & Metzler, 1971).
results were surprising and seemed to challenge contemporary assumptions
about cognition.
The prevalent view of cognition at that time is often referred to as com-
putationalism or cognitivism (e.g., Fodor, 1983). That is, cognition is un-
derstood as information processing based on mental representations. Mental
representations would specifically mean abstract and amodal symbols of en-
tities in the real world which are used to build an internal model of the real
world. The sensorimotor system had little to no relevance to the symbolic
computation of cognition other than being input (perception) and output
(action) to the central cognition module. If cognition is computation in this
sense, then there seems to be no obvious reason why the angle of rotation
should have an impact on computation time.
Results like this one inspired and motivated the pictorial theory of men-
tal imagery (Kosslyn, 1980). Slightly simplified, the pictorial theory poses
that mental imagery employs a specific mental representation in which the
mental image is represented depictively. This mental depiction is located
in the visual cortex in an area which during visual perception presumably
holds the content of what one is seeing. During mental rotation this depic-
16
tion would then literally be rotated in order to solve the task. This new
theory was opposed by an alternative theory – called the descriptive theory
(Pylyshyn, 1973). The descriptive theory poses that no such specific men-
tal representation is necessary, but that mental imagery just like all other
cognitive processing can be explained with abstract and amodal symbols
organized in propositional descriptions. The descriptive theory, however,
faced the problem that mental rotation, and likewise mental scanning, do
produce reaction time patterns seemingly inconsistent with the mere pro-
cessing of abstract symbols. That is, the processing of abstract symbolic
representations of the rotation stimuli should not show a dependance on the
actual angle. This problem was tackled with the proposal that participants
subconsciously emulate these reaction times using their knowledge about,
for example, how long rotation around a certain angle usually takes. This
is referred to as the tacit knowledge explanation.
The dispute between the proponents of these two theories became known
as the imagery debate (Tye, 1991). The imagery debate was considered
one of the hot topics in cognitive science and it has generated countless
publications, studies, and empirical data up to this day. About 40 years
since the onset of the debate, both sides have not changed their theoretical
position much (Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006; Pylyshyn, 2007). But
a new third position was established with the enactive theory of mental
imagery (Thomas, 1999).
The enactive theory incorporates ideas of a paradigm shift in cogni-
tive science. The aforementioned paradigm of computationalism has been
followed-up by the paradigm of embodied cognition over the last years. At
the core of embodied cognition is the assumption that the sensorimotor
system, i.e., the processes of perception and action, constitute much more
than just the input and output for internal mental representations which
then realize the actual cognitive processing but rather are deeply involved
in cognition themselves. The enactive theory differs critically from both
the pictorial and the descriptive theory as it rejects the idea that mental
images are realized through a mental representation which corresponds to
the mental image. Instead, the experience of mentally “seeing” an image is
proposed to result from a re-enactment of visual perception. That is, one
goes through the motions of seeing something in order to mentally imagine
“seeing” it. Critically, this includes the claim that these re-enacted processes
are generally not directed at an internal mental representation but at the
external world.
Given these three quite different theories of mental imagery, how can
we decide which one describes the phenomenon of mental imagery most
accurately? This is the fundamental question of the imagery debate. In
the following, this question, its inherent problems, and a possible way of
facilitating further progress of the imagery debate are discussed.
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1.2 Problem and Method – State of the Imagery
Debate
Relatively early in the imagery debate, it was argued that the problem of
deciding whether mental imagery is realized by a depictive or a descriptive
mental representation cannot be decided with behavioral data (Anderson,
1978; Palmer, 1978). The argument is based on the fact that different mental
representations can always be made to fit arbitrary behavioral data equally
well if the processes working on the respective representation are adjusted
accordingly. Since the respective processes working on either a depictive or a
descriptive mental representation during mental imagery are under-specified
in both the pictorial and the descriptive theory, we cannot ultimately decide
what type of mental representation better fits empirical data.
Generally, different theories can be ranked and evaluated by other mea-
sures than their ability to in principle explain empirical data. These mea-
sures include the efficiency of the proposed mechanisms, their plausibility,
and how parsimonious the theory is (Anderson, 1978; Pylyshyn, 1979). Yet,
none of these measures can be concretely applied to the imagery debate
and the contemporary theories today. The reason is that all three theories
are presented on a descriptive and often vague level. For example, the core
conceptions of the three theories, i.e., the depictive representation of the
pictorial theory, the descriptions or tacit knowledge of the descriptive the-
ory, or the mechanisms behind the re-enactments of the enactive theory, are
not formally defined. Instead, their concrete nature remains under-specified
and in consequence the explanations and the predictions of the theories are
necessarily often subject to the same under-specification.
In order to make the theories of the imagery debate comparable, they
need to be formulated as explicitly and as formally as possible. The most
thorough formalization is the implementation of theories as computational
models. The computational implementation of psychological theories has
several advantages which can facilitate progress of the research question at
hand (e.g., Sun, 2009). For one, an implementation is essentially a detailed
and formalized theory in itself (Sun, 2009). As such it is far less susceptible
to ambiguity and misinterpretation – a problem that the imagery debate
18
currently displays2. Additional advantages of implemented theories include
the ability to run simulations and to provide concrete explanations as well
as concrete predictions for the empirical phenomena. The more concrete
explanations and predictions are, the more directly can they motivate and
facilitate new empirical studies. Resulting new and specifically inconsistent
empirical results can in turn be integrated into the theory in a transpar-
ent manner by refinements and adjustments to the implementation. For
under-specified theories, in contrast, descriptive ad-hoc extensions are often
utilized to allow the explanation of specific (perhaps otherwise inconsistent)
empirical data. This bears the danger that the consequences of such exten-
sions for the overall framework of the theory and for specific explanations
of other phenomena remain untested and unclear. Lastly, sufficiently for-
malized theories can be compared to each other with concrete measures of
plausibility and efficiency that are otherwise not applicable. That is, beyond
the fact that two theories are both generally able to account for the empir-
ical data, two formalized theories can be compared and ranked according
to time complexity (i.e., how complicated are the necessary calculations),
space complexity (i.e., how much storage is necessary for the calculations to
work), and ultimately Occam’s razor (i.e., how parsimonious and simple is
the (implementation of the) theory).
1.3 Aims and Theses
The aims of this thesis are
• the development of a theory of mental imagery which is able to provide
explanations and predictions for a diverse set of empirical phenomena
of mental imagery,
• the development of a formal framework of that theory which allows
concrete implementations, and
• the development of a computational model based on the framework.
2Mutual misunderstandings are a prevalent problem of the imagery debate. For exam-
ple, Kosslyn claims that the enactive theory would essentially be a form of the pictorial
theory if it would be fleshed-out sufficiently (Kosslyn et al., 2006, p. 92) while Thomas
(1999), in contrast, clearly states fundamental incompatibilities between the two theories.
Another example are the diverging opinions on the concept of a functional space in which
mental images are claimed to be represented in the pictorial theory. A discussion between
Pylyshyn (2002) and Kosslyn, Thompson, and Ganis (2002) shows that the interpreta-
tions of such a functional space go so far apart, that Pylyshyn (2002, p. 218) even states
that the assumption of a functional space is either incorrect (and a literal space is actually
meant) or that it would follow that the pictorial theory does not differ from his descriptive
theory. These examples underscore the current inability to fully understand, compare, or
evaluate the contemporary theories as a result of their ambiguous description, i.e., their
lack of formalization.
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The thesis is based on the assumption that a more formal theory of
mental imagery is able to facilitate the imagery debate by providing more
detailed explanations and predictions for empirical phenomena of mental
imagery than the contemporary theories currently do.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
Chapter 2 “Phenomena and Theories of Visuo-Spatial Mental Imagery”
summarizes important empirical results of visuo-spatial mental imagery and
presents the three main contemporary theories of visuo-spatial mental im-
agery. Furthermore, the explanations and potential problems of the three
theories with respect to the discussed phenomena are reviewed.
Chapter 3 “The Perceptual Instantiation Theory” presents and explains
a new theory of visuo-spatial mental imagery. The chapter discusses visual
perception and how mental imagery builds upon the mechanisms of visual
perception.
Chapter 4 “A Formal Framework of PIT” summarizes the core commit-
ments of the perceptual instantiation theory (PIT) and presents a formal
framework of it. Lastly, it compares PIT to the three contemporary theories.
Chapter 5 “The Computational Model” presents a computational imple-
mentation of PIT based on the formal framework developed in the previous
chapter.
Chapter 6 “Evaluation” presents the evaluation of the presented theory
and the computational model. The explanations and predictions for those
empirical phenomena discussed in Chapter 2 are elaborated.
Chapter 7 “Conclusion and Outlook” discusses the contributions of the
thesis and provides an outlook on future work.
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Chapter 2
Phenomena and Theories of
Visuo-Spatial Mental
Imagery
This chapter summarizes important empirical results on visuo-spatial men-
tal imagery. Visuo-spatial mental imagery is the imagination of information
that is usually conveyed via visual perception, i.e., visual and spatial in-
formation. This thesis is concerned with visuo-spatial mental imagery in
contrast to mental imagery of haptics, acoustics, etc. The chapter further-
more reviews the three major contemporary theories of mental imagery and
discusses their explanatory power with respect to the empirical results.
2.1 Empirical Results of Mental Imagery
There is a vast amount of empirical data on visuo-spatial mental imagery in
the literature. This chapter can only report on a subset of these studies. This
subset of phenomena has been selected considering the following factors:
• phenomena that are well established, relatively well researched, and
have been reproduced;
• phenomena for which the contemporary theories differ in their expla-
nation or lack a satisfactory explanation;
• phenomena which cover different aspects of mental imagery.
The considered areas of empirical data cover the general findings that
visuo-spatial mental imagery shows similarities to visual perception (e.g.,
mental scanning), yet, also shows striking differences to visual perception
(e.g., mental reinterpretation). The apparent embodied nature of mental
imagery (e.g., eye movements) is considered as well as the complex role of
21
Figure 2.1: Island stimulus for mental scanning used in (Kosslyn, Ball, &
Reiser, 1978). The island contains different locations that differ in their
distance to each other. In the lower left corner a hut, a well, a lake, and a
tree are visible. On the top is a rock and further locations include grass and
a beach.
attentional processes in both mental imagery and visual perception (e.g.,
unilateral neglect).
2.1.1 Mental Scanning
In studies on mental scanning participants learn a stimulus, for example, the
map of the island in Figure 2.1, which they later mentally imagine. Using
their mental image, participants are asked to shift their attention from one
entity in the image to another entity. It turned out that participants take
significantly longer for attention shift between, for example, the hut and the
rock, than they do for a shift between the hut and the well. This is called
the mental scanning effect. The mental scanning effect is a strong linear
correlation between the time it takes to scan between two entities in the
mental image and the distance between these two entities in the original
stimulus. Several studies have reproduced and shown the robustness of this
effect (for an overview, see Denis & Kosslyn, 1999). In particular, the effect
was shown to persist the following variations:
• Whether participants were explicitly instructed to use mental imagery
(e.g., Kosslyn et al., 1978) or not (e.g., Finke & Pinker, 1982, 1983;
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Pinker, Choate, & Finke, 1984);
• Presentation of additional distance information inconsistent with a
stimulus (Richman, Mitchell, & Reznick, 1979), e.g., indicating that
some routes on a map have a certain distance while the actual distance
in the stimulus is inconsistent with that information;
• Variation of the experimenters’ expectancy of the experimental results,
i.e., the experimenters have a certain (partially false) belief about, a)
the time it generally takes to mentally scan mental images (Intons-
Peterson, 1983; Jolicoeur & Kosslyn, 1985), b) how scanning time
depends on the to-be-scanned distance (Jolicoeur & Kosslyn, 1985),
and c) how scanning time depends on the type of stimulus (Jolicoeur
& Kosslyn, 1985);
• Variation of the participants’ expectancy of the experimental results
about a) the time mental scanning takes in general (Goldston, Hin-
richs, & Richman, 1985), b) how scanning time depends on the to-be-
scanned distance (Goldston et al., 1985);
• Whether participants are instructed to imagine movement (e.g., Koss-
lyn et al., 1978; Richman et al., 1979; Jolicoeur & Kosslyn, 1985),
i.e., participants are instructed to imagine a little black speck moving
between entities, or not (e.g., Finke & Pinker, 1982, 1983);
• Whether the mental image is generated based on a previously pre-
sented visual stimulus (e.g., Kosslyn et al., 1978), generated from in-
formation in long-term memory (Pinker et al., 1984), or generated
from verbal descriptions (e.g., Denis & Cocude, 1992);
• Variation of the salience of the entities used in the mental image (Denis
& Cocude, 1997).
All the above studies report a linear correlation between scanning time
and distance. However, intercept and slope of the linear function describ-
ing the relationship between time and distance have been shown to vary
significantly based on certain variations, e.g., instructions of the task, the
expectations of the experimenters (Intons-Peterson, 1983), as well as the
belief of the participants (e.g., Richman et al., 1979). In particular, it
has been shown that the slope of the function, i.e., the rate or pace of
scanning, can be significantly altered by the participant’s belief about the
time-distance relationship for mental scanning (Goldston et al., 1985). Fur-
thermore, pseudo-experiments1 have shown that participants generally ex-
pect a linear relationship between time and distance for mental scanning
1Pseudo-experiments are experiments in which participants are verbally described an
experimental setting and asked how they think they would behave as participants of that
experiment.
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Figure 2.2: Mental scanning stimuli of (Finke, Pinker, & Farah, 1989). Par-
ticipants were first presented with a dot pattern as displayed on the left side.
The dot pattern was removed and an arrow was presented. The participants
were to judge whether that arrow would point at one of the previously visible
dots or not.
experiments (e.g., Richman et al., 1979; Mitchell & Richman, 1980). This
allows the possibility that participants are not actually employing a “gen-
uine” mental scanning process but emulating reaction times subconsciously
(as it has been suggested in, e.g., Pylyshyn, 1981). However, Reed, Hock,
and Lockhead (1983) report a comparison between participants’ estimations
of scanning time and the time actually taken to mentally scan the same
stimulus. It was found that participants’ estimations differ from the actual
scanning time for at least some stimuli.
Considering the influence of the above discussed factors on the mental
scanning process, Denis and Kosslyn (1999) recognized the need to minimize
any suggestive context in mental scanning experiments and argued for “no
explicit imagery instructions” and that “if participants form and scan im-
ages, they [should] do so spontaneously” (p. 427). Finke and Pinker (1982)
report a mental scanning study that realized such control conditions. Fig-
ure 2.2 shows the stimuli of their experiments. Participants were presented
with a pattern of four black dots on a white background. The pattern was
removed and an arrow appeared for 4s. Participants had to judge whether
the arrow would point at one of the previously visible dots. The distance
between the arrow and the location of the dots was varied. The instructions
did not mention mental images nor (mental) scanning, yet the results showed
the mental scanning effect. This study allowed to visually perceive the arrow
during the decision making, which allows the possibility that participants
make eye movements between the visible arrow and the previous location
of the respective dot. This might be problematic as the observed reaction
times could potentially be the result of eye movements instead of a mental
scanning process. For this reason, Pinker et al. (1984) altered the scanning
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task so that the arrow was not visually shown but its location and orienta-
tion were verbally described. The variation of reaction time with distance
was again significant. This result is important as it gives strong support
to the mental scanning effect being a result of an actual functional mental
process and not a non-functional emulation due to demand characteristics.
Summarizing, the literature reports the following findings: 1) a robust
mental scanning effect, and 2) different factors that influence the mental
scanning effect.
2.1.2 Mental Reinterpretation
Mental reinterpretation is the discovery of a second meaning of an ambiguous
stimulus by only inspecting one’s mental image of that stimulus. The studies
on mental reinterpretation are particularly important for the question of the
nature of mental images as they make the differences between literal pictures
and mental images evident.
One can identify two general classes of stimuli in the literature on men-
tal reinterpretation. Stimuli from these two classes apparently differ in the
difficulty of their mental reinterpretation. In the following, the studies re-
porting on rather easily reinterpretable stimuli are summarized first before
the studies using stimuli that are difficult to mentally reinterpret are sum-
marized.
Finke et al. (1989) have shown that simple geometric shapes mostly re-
sembling alphanumeric characters can be successfully transformed mentally,
i.e., by rotation, superimposition, and juxtaposition, so that new geometric
shapes emerge which can be mentally inspected and recognized. Figure 2.3
shows some of these stimuli and their transformation. The success rate
for the reinterpretation, i.e., the recognition of the emerging new shape,
ranged from roughly 50% to clearly above 50% for those participants able
to correctly follow the transformations. In these experiments the starting
stimuli were described verbally, which is in contrast to nearly all other men-
tal reinterpretation studies which present the initial stimuli visually. Slezak
(1995) reports an experiment with similar stimuli, i.e., mirrored numbers,
and found that about 65% of the participants were able to reinterpret the
stimuli mentally by identifying the number hidden in the shape. In this ex-
periment the stimuli were presented visually. These stimuli are also shown
in Figure 2.3.
Contrasting these comparably simple stimuli, there are studies using
more complex ones, i.e., more complex in the sense that they do not consist
of alphanumeric characters nor only simple geometric shapes. The by far
most used stimuli are ambiguous drawings such as those shown in Figure 2.4.
Among these ambiguous drawings the duck-rabbit is used in nearly all of the
considered studies. Several experiments have shown that it is very hard to
find the second meaning of the duck-rabbit only by inspection of the mental
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Figure 2.3: Reproduction of stimuli used in (Finke et al., 1989) (a) and
(Slezak, 1995) (b). For the upper stimuli, labeled (a), the first figure in each
line is described to the participants verbally who then mentally transform
their mental images according to verbal instructions so that the depicted
intermediate figures should result. The final figure is to be interpreted as
a new object. For the lower two stimuli, labeled (b), the respectively left
one is briefly shown to the participants who then have to find an alternative
interpretation of just the right side of the stimulus using their mental image.
The alternative interpretations are the numbers depicted on the respectively
right side.
image of it (e.g., Chambers & Reisberg, 1985; Peterson, Kihlstrom, Rose, &
Glisky, 1992; Brandimonte & Gerbino, 1993). The success rate of its mental
reinterpretation without any hints ranges from 0% to 5% in the different
studies. Additionally, most studies also report that the large majority (if
not all) of the participants were able to successfully find the second inter-
pretation afterwards using their own drawing of the stimulus from memory.
Slezak (1995) has conducted a series of reinterpretation experiments with
a range of different types of other ambiguous stimuli. Examples of these
stimuli are depicted in Figure 2.5. In this study no participant was able to
find the second interpretation except for some participants for some of the
rotated stimuli, which were, however, attributed to guessing.
It has been shown that different factors can significantly increase success-
ful mental reinterpretation. These factors are: 1) explicit reference frame
hints (e.g., Reisberg & Chambers, 1991), 2) proper selection of training
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Figure 2.4: Reproduction of stimuli used by (Peterson et al., 1992). From
top to bottom, the stimuli show a duck-rabbit, a goose-hawk, and a chef-dog.
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Figure 2.5: Stimuli used in (Slezak, 1995). The top left shows a Kanizsa
illusion (Kanizsa, 1955) in which the emergent triangle is to-be-discovered
mentally. The top right shows a stimulus in which the bars are to be mentally
attached to the middle in order to then find the emergent letters as depicted
to the right. The lower two stimuli show ambiguous drawings which depict
different animals depending on the orientation. These stimuli were mentally
rotated in order to discover the alternative meaning.
stimuli (e.g., Peterson et al., 1992), 3) partitioning of the stimulus (e.g., Pe-
terson et al., 1992), and 4) articulatory suppression during the presentation
of the stimulus (e.g., Brandimonte & Gerbino, 1993). In the following, these
factors are elaborated.
Hyman and Neisser (1991) gave participants information about the ori-
entation and category of the to-be-discovered second meaning of the duck-
rabbit during the inspection of the mental image. These conditions signifi-
cantly increased the participants’ ability to successfully reinterpret the men-
tal image of the duck-rabbit. Brandimonte and Gerbino (1993) replicated
these experiments and report success rates between 5% and 20% when the
different hints were provided. Reisberg and Chambers (1991) used similar
explicit reference frame hints. They found that the mental reinterpretation
of a seemingly arbitrary shape that was a rotated version of the shape of
Texas is significantly influenced by whether participants are told to rotate
and reinterpret their mental image or participants are told that the left
side is to be considered the new top of the shape and then reinterpret their
mental image. In the first case no participant successfully reinterpreted the
stimulus while in the second case more than half of the participants were
successful. The same effect was found for another rotated stimulus as well
as for a figure-ground reversal stimulus (in this case participants either had
no information or were told to reverse figure and ground).
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Successful mental reinterpretation was also increased when participants
were given implicit reference frame hints in the form of training examples
of ambiguous stimuli which require the exact same reference frame transfor-
mation as the later presented experimental stimulus. Peterson et al. (1992)
found that using the goose-hawk (see Figure 2.4) as a training example re-
sulted in significantly higher success of the mental reinterpretation of the
duck-rabbit than other ambiguous training stimuli that require different ref-
erence frame transformations, e.g., the chef-dog (see Figure 2.4).
Peterson et al. (1992), furthermore, tested the effect of different par-
titioning of ambiguous stimuli during the presentation. They partitioned
stimuli into what they called “good” and “bad” parts. The parts were
shown to participants one after the other and participants had to mentally
“glue” them together. After they discovered a first interpretation of the
stimulus, they were asked to find the second one. A partition of the initial
shape was defined as “good” when the parts were “cut” at the minima of
curvature. This method aimed at making the parts more familiar in the
sense that the resulting shapes seem more natural than those of a “bad”
partition. Without giving any reference frame hints, it was found that both
“good” and “bad” partitioning improved mental reinterpretation compared
to the normal presentation of the stimulus. Furthermore, “good” parts led
to a significant increase in successful mental reinterpretation compared to
“bad” parts.
Brandimonte and Gerbino (1993) used articulatory suppression during
the presentation of the stimuli. This is achieved by participants saying
“lalala” aloud during the initial presentation of the stimuli, e.g., the duck-
rabbit. This suppression consistently led to a significant increase in success-
ful mental reinterpretation.
Summarizing, the literature on mental reinterpretation reports: 1) a
distinction between “easy” and “hard” stimuli with differing difficulty of
mental reinterpretation, and 2) a set of different factors that can significantly
increase successful mental reinterpretation.
2.1.3 Eye Movements
Several studies report the occurrence of spontaneous eye movements during
mental imagery. These studies usually present participants with a stimulus
which they later mentally imagine to describe or answer questions about. It
is generally found that eye movements during such imagery tasks reflect the
content of the mental image (e.g., Brandt & Stark, 1997; Spivey & Geng,
2001; Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002; Demarais & Cohen, 1998; Johansson, Hol-
sanova, & Holmqvist, 2006; Johansson, Holsanova, Dewhurst, & Holmqvist,
2011).
In the experiments reported by Johansson et al. (2006) and Johansson,
Holsanova, Dewhurst, and Holmqvist (2011), a distinction between local
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and global correspondence of eye movements to the processed content of
the mental image is defined. Global correspondence requires that an eye
movement is not only directed towards the expected direction, e.g., to the
left when processing the spatial relation left of, but also to a location con-
sistent with the participant’s gaze pattern over the whole experiment, i.e.,
the gaze is directed to the same location every time the same entity is re-
ferred to. Local correspondence requires the eye movement to only match
the expected direction. Johansson et al. (2006) and Johansson, Holsanova,
Dewhurst, and Holmqvist (2011) report experiments in which participants
were either shown a complex and detailed picture or were presented with
the verbal description of a complex and detailed scene. After this perception
phase an imagery phase followed in which participants had to describe the
picture/scene from memory while their eye movements were tracked. Dur-
ing this phase participants were facing a blank white screen. It was varied
whether participants are allowed to freely move their eyes during the percep-
tion phase and during the imagery phase. For participants allowed to freely
move their eyes during both phases, there is a significant local and global
correspondence of their eye movements to the mental image. These results
were reproduced in total darkness. The correspondence remained significant
even when participants were forced to keep a fixed gaze during the percep-
tion phase. When participants had to keep a fixed gaze during the imagery
phase after freely moving their eyes during the perception phase, it was
found that recall is inhibited. Participants reported significantly less detail,
objects, and locations compared to a control group. Furthermore, an anal-
ysis of the given verbal description showed that participants reported more
abstract properties of the stimulus, e.g., global gestalt properties, whereas
a control group reported more concrete details. These results provide evi-
dence that eye movements during mental imagery are 1) functional for the
recall of information from a mental image; 2) occur independently of the
input modality of the stimulus; and 3) are not exact re-enactments of the
eye movements of the visual perception of the stimulus.
Furthermore, it has been found that the spatial dispersion of eye move-
ments during mental imagery depends on individual differences (Johansson,
Holsanova, & Holmqvist, 2011). The spatial mental imagery score of the
“Object-Spatial Imagery and Verbal Questionnaire” (Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov,
2009) was found to be negatively correlated to the spatial dispersion of the
gaze pattern produced during mental imagination of a complex scene. This
spatial mental imagery score reflects a person’s preference and ability to use
spatial mental imagery compared to, for example, visual mental imagery or
language-like thought. Concretely, the spatial distribution of the eye move-
ments, that is, the area participants looked at during imagery shrinks with
higher scores in the ability to use spatial mental imagery.
Summarizing, the literature reports 1) the robust occurrence of sponta-
neous eye movements during mental imagery; 2) that these eye movements
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reflect the content of the mental image; 3) that forcing a fixed gaze affects
mental imagery performance; and 4) that individual differences affect eye
movements, in particular, their spatial dispersion.
2.1.4 Unilateral Neglect
Unilateral neglect is a neuropsychological condition defined by a deficit in
attention or awareness of one side of space. Left unilateral neglect is much
more common than right side unilateral neglect and can be the result of
brain injury to the right cerebral hemisphere usually affecting the parietal
lobe. Right-sided damage causes a neglect for the left side because infor-
mation from the left side of the visual field is processed in the brain’s right
hemisphere. Patients suffering from visual neglect cannot properly attend
to one side of the visual field or one side of objects during visual percep-
tion. For example, they might not eat food on the left side of their plate
or produce drawings in which one side is missing or distorted as shown in
Figure 2.6. Sometimes patients with visual neglect also show imaginal ne-
glect, also referred to as representational neglect. Imaginal neglect is the
inability to correctly attend to or process one side of one’s mental images.
Visual and imaginal neglect are highly complex neuropsychological condi-
tions which are not properly understood theoretically or neurally. Due to
the complexity of the topic and the limited scope of this thesis, only the
core findings on unilateral neglect will be considered. The reason to include
unilateral neglect is the fact that it poses critical constraints on the theories
of mental imagery and is in general hard to concretely reconcile with all
current theories.
Several studies have shown that patients with imaginal neglect fail to
properly process or access the information on one side of their mental im-
ages. For example, patients with imaginal neglect show a great asymmetry
when naming french towns based on an imagined map of France: they men-
tion mostly towns on the non-neglected side (Rode, Rossetti, Perenin, &
Boisson, 2004). This effect was not significant when they were asked to just
name french towns without using a mental image. Bartolomeo, Bachoud-
Levi, Azouvi, and Chokron (2005) report that imaginal neglect patients take
longer to judge whether a french town is left or right of Paris when it is on
the (neglected) left side. In other experiments, patients with imaginal ne-
glect were impaired in their description of the left side of a familiar place,
but were able to report formerly left-sided details once they imagined stand-
ing at the other side of that same place while then neglecting details of the
former right side (Bisiach, Luzzatti, & Peranid, 1979; Bisiach, Capitani,
Luzzatti, & Perani, 1981).
It is generally assumed that the symptoms of unilateral neglect are the
result of several deficits with different severity playing together in the indi-
vidual patient. Yet, the role of attention, specifically exogenous attention
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Figure 2.6: Copies of drawings made by patients with left (visual) unilateral
neglect (taken from (Thomas, 2013))
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(i.e., attending to cues bottom-up), is accepted to be fundamentally involved
in neglect (Bartolomeo & Chokron, 2002, 2001; Bourlon, Oliviero, Wattiez,
Pouget, & Bartolomeo, 2010). For example, patients with visual neglect
show abnormal eye, head, and hand movements, i.e., not attending the ne-
glected side (Behrmann, Watt, Black, & Barton, 1997; Husain et al., 2001),
despite their limbs and eyes being functionally normal. The critical role
of attention is further supported by the fact that the effects of neglect can
sometimes be alleviated by directly guiding a patient’s attention towards
the neglected side, for example, by presenting a very salient stimulus while
the non-neglected side contains little to no cues (e.g., Bartolomeo, 2007).
It is an important fact, that there is a double dissociation between imagi-
nal neglect and visual neglect (Coslett, 1997). This means, there are patients
who display healthy vision while showing neglect in mental imagery and,
similarly, there are patients that display healthy mental imagery but show
visual neglect. This dissociation means that (partially) different processes
must underlie the two types of neglect.
Summarizing, there are three major findings on unilateral neglect which
are relevant for theories of mental imagery: 1) the impairment of accessing
information on one side of a mental image in imaginal neglect; 2) the dissoci-
ation of visual and imaginal neglect; and 3) the apparent role of attentional
processes in visual and imaginal neglect.
2.2 Theories of Mental Imagery
This section reviews the three main theories of visuo-spatial mental imagery:
the pictorial theory (Kosslyn, 1994; Kosslyn et al., 2006), the descriptive the-
ory (Pylyshyn, 2002, 2007), and the enactive theory (Thomas, 1999). There
are other theories that deal with mental imagery which are not explicitly dis-
cussed here. The reason for omitting them is that these theories (currently)
do not aim at explaining a broad range of phenomena of mental imagery but
either focus on the explanation of specific results or on providing a general
framework of human cognition and do not elaborate in depth on the frame-
work’s application to different mental imagery phenomena (e.g., perceptual
symbol systems and the simulation theory of cognition, see Barsalou, 2008;
Hesslow, 2012). The theory of visuo-spatial working memory of Logie (2003)
is formulated more broadly as a theory of working memory and focusses
on aspects often not directly addressed by the other theories of mental im-
agery, such as the relation between different components of working memory
and the selective interference between them. The mental model theory is
largely concerned with reasoning on mental models which are generally con-
sidered amodal with mental imagery being a specific case of a mental model
(Johnson-Laird, 2001). Both the visuo-spatial working memory model and
the mental model theory are addressed in Section 7.2.2 where the theory
33
presented in this thesis is related to them.
2.2.1 The Pictorial Theory
The pictorial theory has been developed and shaped mostly by Stephen
Kosslyn. I will focus on the theory in its current form (Kosslyn, 1994;
Kosslyn et al., 2006) which replaced a previous version (Kosslyn, 1980). The
pictorial theory comprises several components that interact during mental
imagery. Most components and processes are proposed to also be employed
in visual perception, in particular, for object recognition.
The theory distinguishes between two types of mental images: spatial
mental images and visual mental images. A spatial mental image is described
as an object map that is held in the spatial-properties-processing subsystem
(SPP) and generated from information from associative memory (AM). The
object map comprises information such as location, size, and orientation of
entities. It does not hold any visual information, e.g., color and shape. New
spatial relations can be inferred by the SPP.
A visual mental image also relies on an object map in the SPP, but it fur-
ther depicts visual information in the visual buffer (VB). Visual information,
e.g., shape and color, are stored in an encoded form in the object-properties-
processing subsystem (OPP). The information is decoded into a depictive
pattern of activation that is evoked in the VB during visual mental imagery.
The SPP determines properties such as size and location of the shape that
the OPP maps into the VB. If a visual mental image contains multiple parts,
i.e., shapes, this process is successively repeated for each part. The resulting
mental image is not necessarily complete as parts might be missing due to
fading or not being generated yet. Parts can be “refreshed” by mapping
them from the OPP to the VB again.
The VB is described as a hybrid depictive representation. It is a depictive
representation in the sense that space is used to represent space. That is, a
shape is represented by an activation in the VB that resembles that shape.
But, each “point [...] [in the VB] represents more than the presence or
absence in space. Rather, properties such as color, intensity, depth, and
motion are also specified at each location, using a symbolic (propositional)
code” (Kosslyn et al., 2006, p. 136). It is stressed that the visual buffer and
visual mental images are functionally depictive. This means that they do not
have to be literally depictive in the sense of a picture in which two adjacent
points are physically adjacent, but that these two points are accessed (in
generation or inspection of the mental image) as two adjacent points even
though they might be physically further apart in the neural substrate of the
VB. For the rest of the thesis I will use the term “depictive” in this sense.
In order to generate and inspect visual mental images, a part of the VB is
accessed by the attention window (AW). That is, only a part of the VB can
be processed at one time. Inspection of visual mental images uses matching
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with stored (encoded) shapes in the OPP to recognize the content of the VB.
Accessing a given part of the mental image in the VB is either realized by
scanning, i.e., successively moving the attention window, or parts can “pop
out” without mentally scanning to the respective location in the VB. The
theory assumes that the processing of mental images in the VB is the same as
the processing of actual visual input, i.e., “[o]nce a configuration of activity
exists in the visual buffer, input is sent to the ventral and dorsal systems
and is processed in the usual ways – regardless of whether the activity arose
from immediate input from the eyes or from information stored in memory”
(Kosslyn, 1994, p. 336).
The core of this theory is the assumption of a depictive mental represen-
tation that holds the mental image so that it resembles what it represents.
This resemblance is what conveys the meaning of the content of the mental
image. The content of the mental image is accessed by the same inspection
processes used in visual perception.
2.2.2 The Descriptive Theory
The descriptive theory, also known as the propositional theory, is proposed
as a null hypothesis to the pictorial theory (Pylyshyn, 2002). Its essen-
tial claim is that there is not sufficient evidence and no need for a specific
mental representation, i.e., a depictive representation, to account for men-
tal imagery. Instead it is proposed that the empirical results of mental
imagery can be explained by mental representations in the form of sym-
bolic descriptions (Pylyshyn, 2002, p. 163), e.g., mentalese (Fodor, 1975),
which are furthermore assumed to underlie (high-level) cognition in general.
Those empirical results which indicate a spatio-analogical nature of mental
images, e.g., mental rotation and mental scanning, could prima facie not
be explained by description-like mental representations. Therefore, the em-
ployment of tacit knowledge was proposed in the context of the descriptive
theory (Pylyshyn, 1981) to account for these results.
Pylyshyn (2002) stresses that in order to understand the mental mech-
anisms underlying mental imagery it is necessary to distinguish between
observable behavior due to the intrinsic nature of mental imagery, i.e., the
fixed mental representations and their processes, and behavior due to the
tacit knowledge of a participant. Tacit knowledge refers to the mental state
of a participant that can be directly or indirectly altered, e.g., a partici-
pant’s goals or beliefs. The type of tacit knowledge that is mostly relevant
to explain the common phenomena of mental imagery is a participant’s tacit
knowledge about what it would be like to visually perceive something. The
intrinsic nature of mental imagery would, on the other hand, be defined by
what is called the cognitive architecture. The cognitive architecture com-
prises the mental representations and processes which cannot be altered by
a participant’s tacit knowledge.
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The descriptive theory claims that many of the observed properties of
mental imagery, e.g., the mental scanning effect, are not a result of a spatio-
analogical format of mental images, i.e., mental images being depictive, but
that they result from the application of tacit knowledge of what it would be
like to perceive what is to-be-imagined. To be clearer, the task to mentally
imagine an entity X leads participants to simulate as many of the prop-
erties as possible of what visual perception of X would be like using their
tacit knowledge about seeing X as well as psychophysical skills such as es-
timating the time it would take to see X (Pylyshyn, 1981). The underlying
cognitive architecture of mental images could still have the form of symbolic
descriptions which are not spatio-analogical. From this claim it follows that
altering a participant’s tacit knowledge will also alter the analogical prop-
erties of mental imagery. If the observed behavior for a given task can be
altered by altering the participant’s tacit knowledge, this task is said to be
cognitively penetrable.
For some mental imagery tasks, other mechanisms than the application
of tacit knowledge are proposed to explain the empirical data. For example,
visual indexing is the process of subconsciously binding parts of a mental
image to different locations in the visual field, e.g., a chair or a stain on the
wall. When processing a part of the mental image eye movements are made
to the respective location thus possibly creating the mental scanning effect
and spontaneous eye movements.
Summarizing, the descriptive theory is to be understood not as a fleshed-
out theory but as a null hypothesis to the pictorial theory. As such it serves
the purpose of providing “[...] a test for the irrelevance of assumptions
about the image format.” (Pylyshyn, 2002, reply to comments, p. 227).
More precisely, it provides an alternative explanation for the empirical data
on mental imagery. And this explanation does not rely on a special for-
mat of the mental representation, i.e., one that is different from symbolic
descriptions.
2.2.3 The Enactive Theory
The enactive theory, or perceptual-activity theory, of mental imagery con-
trasts the two traditional theories in some fundamental aspects. The en-
active theory of mental imagery is described by Thomas (1999). It builds
upon ideas of the ecological approach to vision (Gibson, 1986) and the work
of Neisser (1976) on schemata.
The enactive theory generally applies to all modalities of perception and
the respective type of mental imagery, but its focus has been on visual per-
ception and visuo-spatial mental imagery. I identify four fundamental as-
sumptions made by the enactive theory: 1) non-existence of explicit mental
representations, 2) perception as an on-going process of active interrogation
of the environment, 3) the existence of specialized perceptual instruments
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used to retrieve specific information, and 4) schemata as subconscious data
structures guiding the employment of the perceptual instruments. In the
following, these assumptions are elaborated.
The enactive theory rejects the existence of explicit mental representa-
tions. An explicit mental representation is to be understood as a mental
state which directly corresponds and thus stands in for an entity. Examples
include specifically depictive and descriptive mental representations of the
content of mental images. In the enactive theory there is “no thing or state
in the mind or brain [that] corresponds to the percept or image” (Thomas,
1999, p. 223). From the perspective of the traditional theories of mental
imagery explicit representations, image-like or description-like, are created
as (end) products of perception that comprise information of what is seen.
These representations are processed/inspected when one imagines the entity
they represent. In the enactive theory such end products of perception are
never created, instead perception is an on-going process.
This directly leads to the second assumption of the enactive theory: the
understanding of perception as an active and on-going process and not as
an input mechanism for mental representations. For example, the enactive
theory states that the experience of visually perceiving a cat is constituted
by the employment of those perceptual processes that “fit” the stimulus of
a cat. In particular, visually perceiving a cat is not creating or activating
a certain mental representation that symbolizes a cat, but perceiving a cat
corresponds to the activity of successfully applying the respective perceptual
processes.
The third assumption states that these perceptual processes are made up
by specific employments of different perceptual instruments. The perceptual
instruments of visual perception contain, for example, different types of
eye movements, head movements, and also, in principle, querying neural
states. These instruments are actively employed in order to retrieve specific
types of information2. The recognition of a cat can thus be imagined as an
interrogation of the environment about the necessary properties of a cat.
This process is highly dynamic as the choice of the next interrogation step
directly depends on the feedback of the previous interrogation steps.
The fourth assumption is that this interrogation process is controlled by
data structures termed schemata. Schemata can be imagined as acquired
procedural knowledge of how and when to use which perceptual instrument
given the current feedback of the perceptual instruments. Concretely, a
schema is defined as “a data structure, implemented in the brain, that
functions to govern perceptual exploration of the world so that appropriate
perceptual tests are applied at appropriate times and places, and that is
continuously modified or updated by the results returned by those tests so
2What different perceptual instruments exist and how they are used to retrieve specific
types of information is, however, an open question.
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as to be able to govern perceptual exploration more efficiently in the future”
(Thomas, 2002). We can thus think of a set of schemata that instruct
the perception and recognition of a cat by specifying which visual features
and spatial relations between them have to be successfully tested by the
respective perceptual instruments. The successful testing of these aspects
corresponds to the experience of seeing something.
Mental imagery comes about when, for example, the schemata for cat are
granted (at least partial) control of the respective perceptual instruments
and try to recognize a cat while there is actually no cat to be perceived.
Compared to visual perception, the employment of the perceptual instru-
ments is either not fully executed or the bottom-up input of the perceptual
instruments is ignored during mental imagery. These differences account for
the distinct experiences of perception and imagination.
Summarizing, the enactive theory explains (the experience of) men-
tal imagery with the employment of several different perceptual processes
guided by respective schemata, which implicitly represent how one visually
recognizes a given object.
2.2.4 Summary and Comparison of the Theories
The following provides a brief summary and comparison of the three contem-
porary theories with respect to 1) the representation of the mental image; 2)
the spatio-analogical character of mental imagery, and 3) what constitutes
mental imagery.
The representation of the mental image:
• Pictorial theory: the mental image is depictively represented in the
visual buffer
• Descriptive theory: the mental image is propositionally represented by
amodal descriptions
• Enactive theory: the mental image is not represented directly. In-
stead the processes that lead to the experience of mental imagery are
encoded in the respective schemata
The spatio-analogical character of mental imagery refers to the fact that
behavior in mental imagery is often analogical to behavior expected for an
actual picture. The mental scanning effect is an example that shows this
spatio-analogical character of mental imagery. There are several more ex-
amples, e.g., inspecting “smaller” parts of a mental images takes longer than
inspecting “bigger” parts (for an overview of similar studies, see Kosslyn,
1980). The three theories explain this spatio-analogical character of mental
imagery as follows:
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• Pictorial theory: The spatio-analogical character of mental imagery
results from the spatio-analogical structure of the visual buffer which
holds the depictive mental image. That is, the processing of the mental
image is determined by the structure of the mental representation.
• Descriptive theory: The spatio-analogical character results from the
non-functional application of one’s tacit knowledge. That is, applying
the knowledge of what perceiving the to-be-imagined entity would be
like and subconsciously emulating of these properties, e.g., expected
reaction time patterns.
• Enactive theory: The employment of the processes of visual perception
including non-mental processes such as eye movements give mental
imagery the same spatio-analogical properties that the visual system
has, e.g., longer attention shifts (such as saccades) take more time.
The three theories, furthermore, differ in their assumption of what men-
tal imagery is:
• Pictorial theory: mental imagery is the processing of the mental image
in the visual buffer using processes of visual perception. This under-
standing is based on the assumption that the visual buffer is similarly
used during visual perception to provide a mental representation of
what is currently perceived.
• Descriptive theory: mental imagery is the processing of the respec-
tive amodal descriptions which represent the mental image. These
descriptions are not processed by modality-specific mechanisms such
as processes of visual perception. Mental imagery is further defined
by the concurrent (non-functional) application of one’s tacit knowledge
about how the content of the current mental image would be perceived
in visual perception. Tacit knowledge causes the characteristic behav-
ior, e.g., reaction time patterns, of mental imagery. If descriptions are
processed without the application of tacit knowledge, this would be
considered general cognitive processing and not mental imagery.
• Enactive theory: mental imagery arises through the employment of
those schemata which are otherwise used to perceive real-world en-
tities. It is those entities which are mentally imagined when these
schemata are employed without fitting real-world stimuli. That is, the
re-enactment of the perception of an entity corresponds to the mental
imagination of that entity.
2.3 Evaluation of the Theories
The following gives a brief overview of the explanations and problems of the
three contemporary theories with respect to the above reviewed phenomena
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of visuo-spatial mental imagery.
2.3.1 Mental Scanning and Cognitive Penetration
The mental scanning effect in its general form is fundamental to the study of
mental imagery and accordingly all contemporary theories provide plausible
accounts of it.
The pictorial theory provides a structural explanation as the men-
tal image is assumed to be represented in the visual buffer which has the
property that the metrics of the stimulus are kept in its mental representa-
tion. The inspection processes working on the visual buffer are constrained
so that they process the mental image successively, i.e., scanning from one
point to another on the mental image shifts attention through all the points
in between. The linear relation of reaction time and distance is therefore the
result of the metrical representation and the respective inspection processes.
The descriptive theory provides a tacit knowledge explanation which
states that participants use their tacit knowledge of what the scanning task
would be like in visual perception and subconsciously emulate reaction times
accordingly.
The enactive theory provides what I term an equivalence explana-
tion for the general mental scanning effect. The enactive theory proposes
the employment of perceptual processes of visual perception during mental
imagery so that the process of visually perceiving is re-enacted. Because
the mental scanning effect exists in visual perception, e.g., a saccade over
a longer distance takes longer, the mental scanning effect is also evident in
mental imagery.
The findings that the mental scanning effect can be varied in specifi-
cally its slope, i.e., the speed of scanning, by a variety of different factors
(as reviewed in Section 2.1.1) poses a more difficult challenge than the gen-
eral mental scanning effect itself for the structural explanation of the
pictorial theory. Because the speed of scanning varies, for example, with
the expectation of the participants about how long mentally scanning a cer-
tain distance takes, the observed reaction times can at most partially result
from the structure of the visual buffer. This problem is an instance of the
cognitive penetration argument against the pictorial theory made by
Pylyshyn (e.g., Pylyshyn, 2002). The argument is that if a participant’s be-
lief or knowledge can alter his behavior, e.g., reaction time, during mental
imagery, then the measured behavior cannot be due to the properties of a
fixed representational structure such as the visual buffer. Figure 2.7 explains
an experiment of Richman et al. (1979) which is an example of how the men-
tal scanning effect can be manipulated. These findings suggest that if the
structure of the mental representation contributes to the mental scanning
effect then it does so as one out of several factors. That is, because partic-
ipants reliably show different scanning speeds due to individual differences,
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Figure 2.7: Two stimuli depicting an island similar to those used in the
mental scanning experiments of (Richman et al., 1979). The island on the
right differs from the left one in that it additionally contains sign posts
indicating inconsistent distances between the hut and the tree (80 miles),
and the hut and the well (20 miles). Richman et al. (1979) found that these
sign posts had a significant effect on the mental scanning time along those
routes so that mentally scanning along the “80” route took longer than
mentally scanning along the “20” route.
e.g., current beliefs, or different demand characteristics (e.g., Goldston et
al., 1985) scanning speed cannot be constrained only by the structure of the
mental image. However, the pictorial theory does not offer concrete mech-
anisms how both structure and additionally task demands and individual
differences contribute to the variations of the mental scanning effect.
Neither the descriptive nor the enactive theory have been concretely ap-
plied to such variations of mental scanning. The descriptive theory seems
consistent with the results of the experiment in Figure 2.7, because it as-
sumes mental imagery to be based on interpreted descriptions which could
in principle account for the integration of actual and suggested distances.
However, the descriptive theory does not make any claims with respect to
the concrete mechanisms or the role of tacit knowledge for these cases. The
enactive theory is currently not fleshed out enough to be applied to these
results. Specifically, perceptual re-enactments alone seem insufficient to ex-
plain how the semantics of the sign posts influence the scanning times.
2.3.2 Difficulty of Mental Reinterpretation
The pictorial theory would at first predict that mental reinterpretation of
stimuli such as the duck-rabbit is possible and likely according to the the-
ory’s assumptions that “[o]nce a configuration of activity exists in the visual
buffer, input is sent to the ventral and dorsal systems and is processed in the
usual ways – regardless of whether the activity arose from immediate input
from the eyes or from information stored in memory” (Kosslyn, 1994, p.
336). The pictorial theory explains the fact that the lack of successful men-
tal reinterpretation of the duck-rabbit, the Necker cube, and the Schro¨der
staircase (Chambers & Reisberg, 1985) clearly does not fit this assumption
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by the complexity of these stimuli. Their complexity does not allow one to
properly maintain enough of the mental image in the visual buffer at the
same time due to the parts of the image constantly fading (Kosslyn, 1994).
This “complexity argument” has been criticized (e.g., Thomas, 1999;
Slezak, 1995) based on the grounds that other stimuli which are assumed to
be processed using mental imagery by the pictorial theory are of similar if
not higher complexity, e.g., the figures of the mental rotation experiments
(Shepard & Metzler, 1971), the island map used in mental scanning experi-
ments (e.g., Kosslyn et al., 1978) or the assumed imagination of two animals
in a comparison task (Kosslyn, 1975). If fading plays a role in the inspec-
tion of the duck-rabbit, then it is surprising that fading is not considered or
necessary to consider in these other imagery tasks. Stimuli which are easier
to mentally reinterpret (e.g., Finke et al., 1989) are consequently assigned a
lower complexity explaining the difference to stimuli such as the duck-rabbit.
Kosslyn (1994) acknowledges the empirical data showing that different hints
facilitate mental reinterpretation. This is assumed to affect the current or-
ganization of one’s mental image into perceptual units. A reorganization of
these perceptual units into which a mental image is partitioned is necessary
in order to successfully reinterpret a mental image. Such perceptual units
can be understood as the composition of the mental image. For example,
a mental image of the star of David, can be seen both as two overlapping
triangles and as a hexagon with six attached triangles. The theory does,
however, not elaborate on the relationship between what is depicted in the
visual buffer and the organization of that depiction into perceptual units
with respect to the generation and inspection as well as the fading of mental
images.
The difficulty of mental interpretation in general lends support to the de-
scriptive theory’s assumption that mental imagery relies entirely on abstract
and interpreted descriptions and does not utilize modality-specific processes
or representations of visual perception. The mental reinterpretation of eas-
ier stimuli can be attributed to general (symbolic) reasoning processes that
do not require any depictive representations. Given that these stimuli con-
sist of simple geometrical shapes is it plausible that symbolic descriptions
alone can represent them with sufficient detail. The descriptive theory does,
however, not go into any detail about the possible mechanisms of mental
reinterpretation. Also it remains unclear how different hints can generally
facilitate mental reinterpretation of stimuli such as the duck-rabbit which
are assumed to generally not be mentally reinterpretable because they are
solely represented by interpreted and abstracted symbolic descriptions.
The enactive theory only briefly discusses its account of mental reinter-
pretation. The difficulty of stimuli such as the duck-rabbit is attributed
to the fact that different schemata essentially represent how one looks at
something in order to recognize it. That is, if one first interpreted the pic-
ture of the duck-rabbit as a rabbit, one will employ the respective schemata
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that correspond to seeing something as a rabbit during mental imagery.
Thus one is inhibited in seeing the mental image as something different,
i.e., a duck. The enactive theory further suggests that the easier stimuli
of Finke et al. (1989) can be mentally reinterpreted because of a specific
(acquired) familiarity with simple shapes and letters. This familiarity with
such shapes in many different orientations and circumstances supports the
ability to imagine them in many different ways, e.g., after they have been
rotated or otherwise manipulated as it is the case for the tasks employed by
Finke et al. (1989). It is not discussed how and why different types of hints
can facilitate mental reinterpretation.
2.3.3 Functionality of Eye Movements
Mast and Kosslyn (2002) have argued that spontaneous eye movements dur-
ing mental imagery are consistent with the pictorial theory. They suggest
that eye movements might be stored and recalled during mental imagery
in order to trigger sequences of memories and specifically help to correctly
position parts of a mental image in the visual buffer. A more detailed ex-
planation on the relationship between eye movements and the content of
mental images has not been provided so far. Note that spontaneous eye
movements cannot be directly integrated into the pictorial theory as they
lead to new bottom-up information being sent from the eyes to the early vi-
sual areas likely “overwriting” the current mental image in the visual buffer.
Furthermore, it has been speculated that the saccadic suppression3 of eye
movements being executed during mental imagery might be responsible for
the fast fading of mental images in the visual buffer (Kosslyn, 1994, p. 101).
The concept of visual indexing has been proposed within the frame-
work of the descriptive theory (e.g., Pylyshyn, 2007). Visual indexing is
the process of binding entities of one’s mental image to visual cues in the
environment in order to facilitate processing and saving working memory
resources by outsourcing information to the external world. Visual index-
ing explains spontaneous eye movements during mental imagery as such eye
movements would be made towards those visual cues in the environment
to which mental entities have been bound. This explanation is, however,
at odds with the findings that such spontaneous eye movements have been
found even when participants were facing a blank white wall and also when
in total darkness (Johansson et al., 2006). In these cases the environment
likely could not have provided any visual cues for indexing. Furthermore,
spontaneous eye movements during mental imagery would generally not be
predicted by the descriptive theory because of its assumption that mental
imagery does not require the employment of modality-specific processes or
representations.
3Saccadic suppression is the fact that “seeing” is suppressed during the execution of a
saccade.
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Eye movements during mental imagery link naturally to the enactive
theory because of its assumptions that exploratory perceptual processes of
visual perception are (partially) executed during mental imagery. Further-
more, it follows from the functional role of these perceptual processes that
a restriction of eye movements negatively affects the performance of recall
and availability of information of the mental images. The enactive theory
does currently not provide further details on the link between spontaneous
eye movements and mental imagery such as, for example, what types of
information are conveyed through the employment of eye movements.
2.3.4 The Constraints of Unilateral Neglect on Theories of
Mental Imagery
There are three major findings on unilateral neglect which are relevant for
theories of mental imagery: 1) the impairment of accessing information on
one side of a mental image that is otherwise available (i.e., imaginal neglect),
2) the dissociation of visual and imaginal neglect, and 3) the apparent role
of attentional processes in visual and imaginal neglect.
The pictorial theory could in principle account for imaginal and visual
neglect by assuming damage to the respective side of the visual buffer. How-
ever, the fact that visual and imaginal neglect can be dissociated from each
other (Coslett, 1997) voids this explanation, because the visual buffer is as-
sumed to be employed alike in both vision and imagery. Thus such a dam-
aged visual buffer would always show neglect in both vision and imagery.
Bartolomeo (2002) concluded that the pictorial theory requires visual and
imaginal neglect to be caused by damage to anatomically and functionally
different components outside of the visual buffer. Locating such a compo-
nent for the case of preserved mental imagery but impaired visual perception,
i.e., visual neglect without imaginal neglect, is particularly difficult as “[...]
one wonders where the anatomical locus of impairment should be located”
(Bartolomeo, 2002, p. 361) given that the visual buffer already comprises
the earliest areas of the occipital lobe and that the pictorial theory explicitly
assumes that content of the visual buffer is processed alike independently
of whether the content of the buffer came from the eyes during vision or
memory during imagery (Kosslyn, 1994, p. 336). Accordingly, Bartolomeo
(2002) draws the conclusion that the existence of such a visual buffer for
both bottom-up visual perception and top-down imagery is not supported
by the sum of the results for visual and imaginal neglect. In defense of the
pictorial theory in this respect, I see the possibility that visual neglect is
caused by damage to processes of attention which control what information
of the world is projected into the visual buffer by controlling where the eyes
are looking at. At the same time imagery would remain healthy in case of
such damage because it presumably does not rely on external attention nor
input from the eyes in the pictorial theory. Imaginal neglect with healthy
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vision could be caused by damage to those processes that project content
from memory to the visual buffer. It is, however, questionable to which
extent this function, i.e., projecting information from memory to the buffer,
is necessary for vision as it has been proposed that mental imagery plays a
role in pattern matching during visual perception (Kosslyn, 1994, p. 259).
Either way, the pictorial theory still faces the related problem that the neu-
ropsychological literature reports that damage to the occipital lobe (i.e., the
presumed locus of the visual buffer) is neither sufficient nor necessary for
deficits in mental imagery (Bartolomeo, 2002; Goldenberg, 1998; Trojano
& Grossi, 1994). For example, a recent study reports of a patient experi-
encing vivid visual mental imagery despite near-complete cortical blindness
caused by damage to area V1 (Bridge, Harrold, Holmes, Stokes, & Kennard,
2012). These neuropsychological results show that early visual areas are not
functional for mental imagery. That is, they show the implausibility of the
visual buffer as assumed by the pictorial theory.
The fact that processing of mental images is disrupted with respect to
the information on only one side in imaginal neglect seems hard to account
for by the descriptive theory. The descriptive theory assumes that men-
tal images are represented and processed in an amodal format that is not
analogically structured. If the underlying representation of the mental im-
age is not structured (spatio-)analogically, then there is no plausible reason
why accessing exactly those parts that refer to entities on one side should
be disrupted. This problem is acknowledged by Pylyshyn who states that
“it would be odd for a symbolic encoding system by itself to have direc-
tional preferences, such as found in neglect, and I also agree that most cases
of imaginal neglect are unlikely to be due to tacit knowledge” (Pylyshyn,
2002, in reply to comments, R5.3).
Altogether, the combined empirical results of unilateral neglect seem in-
compatible with both the descriptive and the pictorial theory. Furthermore,
Bartolomeo (2002) interprets the combined results of visual and imaginal
neglect to provide evidence that theories of mental imagery that assume at-
tentional processes to underlie mental imagery, instead of an internal repre-
sentation, are most plausible. In particular, he refers to the enactive theory
as it assumes schemata as attentional procedures employed in visual per-
ception as well as mental imagery. He states that “[i]f the application of
these procedures can be constrained either by the external environment or
by memory processes, with distinct neural correlates subserving these occur-
rences, then double dissociations between perceptual and imagery abilities
are expected to arise in brain-damaged patients” (Bartolomeo, 2002, p.374).
It is, however, currently not possible to further evaluate the applicability of
the enactive theory to unilateral neglect in more depth due to its currently
under-specified state.
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2.3.5 Summary
The above review of the contemporary theories of mental imagery and their
applicability to the considered empirical phenomena has shown that the
three theories’ descriptive level of formulation does often not allow in-depth
explanations for some aspects of the phenomena. Furthermore, the phe-
nomena of functional eye movements and the constraints of the findings on
unilateral neglect are hard to reconcile with both the descriptive and the
pictorial theory. The enactive theory promises the possibility to overcome
some of the problems of the other two theories; yet, it is also the theory that
is described most vaguely and currently considered more of a sketch than
a fleshed-out theory (Thomas, 1999). In the next chapter, a new theory of
mental imagery will be proposed which builds upon some of the assumptions
of the enactive theory, but is aimed at providing a comparatively concrete
description of the involved mechanisms of mental imagery.
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Chapter 3
The Perceptual Instantiation
Theory
This chapter introduces the perceptual instantiation theory (PIT) of visuo-
spatial mental imagery. It discusses how PIT understands visual perception
and visuo-spatial mental imagery. Chapter 4 will then present a formal
summary of PIT and Chapter 5 will present a computational model of PIT.
3.1 Visual Perception
Visuo-spatial mental imagery is intimately related to visual perception.
Therefore, in order to explain mental imagery, it is necessary to do so based
on a clear conception of visual perception.
3.1.1 Visual Perception in the Enactive Theory
The summaries of the three contemporary theories of mental imagery and
their comparison in Section 2.2 made it evident that the enactive theory
stands out against both the pictorial and the descriptive theory in a few
important points. In the following, two such points regarding how the enac-
tive theory understands visual perception and mental imagery are explicitly
elaborated:
• The enactive theory emphasizes the role of the attentional and per-
ceptual processes directed at external stimuli, e.g., the role of eye
movements, in perception and mental imagery. In contrast, the picto-
rial and the descriptive theory are generally not concerned with these
processes and do, instead, assume mental imagery to be realized on a
“higher” level. That is, the processing of mental representations by
mechanisms aimed not at external entities but at the mental represen-
tation of entities.
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• Accordingly, the understanding of visual perception of the enactive
theory differs from that of the other two theories. Perception in the
enactive theory consists of several different specialized perceptual in-
struments which are selectively used to retrieve specific information
from the environment. In the other theories, in contrast, perception
seems to be assumed as a much more generic process whose major
task is providing input to the visual buffer (in the pictorial theory) or
to the propositional descriptions (in the descriptive theory). The rele-
vant processing of visual perception and mental imagery is accordingly
based on these resulting mental representations.
The enactive theory’s view of visual perception is partly based on and
partly consistent with ideas of active vision (Ballard, 1991), sensorimotor
contingencies (O’Regan & Noe, 2001), and ecological vision (Gibson, 1986).
Also because of its different understanding of visual perception, the en-
active theory seems to be the most promising candidate to plausibly incor-
porate the finding of spontaneous functional eye movements during mental
imagery as well as being potentially consistent with the constraints posed
by the findings on unilateral neglect (see Section 2.3). Yet, the applicability
of the enactive theory to all of the considered phenomena is limited as its
functional details have not been worked out.
PIT adopts the above mentioned assumptions about visual perception
from the enactive theory as well as the functional “re-use” of perceptual
processes in mental imagery. These assumptions will be fleshed-out and
combined with multi-modal grounded symbols – referred to as mental con-
cepts.
3.1.2 An Example of Visual Perception
The recognition of an object, for example, a square, in visual perception is
the result of the application of several different low-level processes of the
human visual system. The information necessary to recognize a square in-
cludes the edges, their intersection, the relative location and orientation of
these features, the separation of the features from the background, whether
some of the features go into depth, and much more. The human visual sys-
tem actively and in a largely top-down fashion applies specific perceptual
actions to actively find out about these different types of information with
the aim to identify the most likely alternative of all those things that the
currently perceived object could be.
This view of visual perception means that recognition is not a comparison
or pattern-matching process working on a mental representation of what is
currently being perceived. But recognition is the successful application of
specific perceptual actions to the external stimulus, e.g., the eye movements
and their respective feedback lead to the recognition of a square. After
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the perceived object has been interpreted as a square, much information is
discarded and an abstract conceptual description of the object remains in
long-term memory. That is, if one remembers the object in question after
some time, the fact that it was, for example, a red small square, remains, but
many details, such as the exact size, location, orientation, or color, are often
missing or have been replaced by generic information. The information that
has been lost by this abstraction comprises the low-level information that
was made available by the perceptual actions. This includes, specifically, the
coordinates of the object in an ego-centric reference frame, through which
information about concrete size, orientation, depth, location, and visual
features of the object can be determined. Such information is available
during and shortly after the perceptual process on that level of granularity
that the visual system is capable of perceiving and distinguishing. This
information is referred to as perceptual information. In contrast, the
abstracted conceptual memory of that object – red, small, square – could
be seen as qualitative information, but will be referred to as conceptual
information, or simply mental concepts.
In this section, three important aspects were introduced: 1) percep-
tual actions, 2) perceptual information, and 3) mental concepts. A fourth
important aspect is a modality-specific long-term memory of visual percep-
tion referred to as visuo-spatial long-term memory which controls the
interplay between perceptual actions, perceptual information, and mental
concepts. The next sections will elaborate on these aspects.
3.1.3 Visuo-Spatial Long-Term Memory
The visuo-spatial long-term memory (abbreviated VS-LTM) constitutes the
procedural knowledge of how to look at the world in order to recognize
entities, properties, and relations. For this purpose the VS-LTM provides
two mappings: 1) a mapping of perceptual information onto mental con-
cepts, and 2) a mapping of mental concepts onto perceptual actions. These
mappings are acquired procedural knowledge and are continuously adapted.
Let’s looks at a simple example of how those two types of mappings of
the VS-LTM work during visual perception.
Mapping of perceptual information onto mental concepts: From
the current fixation of an object O1 a saccade is triggered bottom-up towards
the salient object O2. Saccades are a type of perceptual actions. The exe-
cution of the saccade yields a type of perceptual information. The type of
perceptual information is the change of the coordinates of the gaze from the
previous position (on O1) to the new position (on O2). This information is
mapped onto a set of mental concepts, which are thereby identified. In this
case these are spatial relations that hold between O1 and O2.
Figure 3.1 shows how this example of a mapping of perceptual informa-
tion onto mental concepts can be described more formally. The figure also
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shows how the mapping of perceptual information onto mental concepts is
a many-to-many mapping. That is, different perceptual information can be
mapped onto one same mental concept and the same perceptual information
can be mapped onto different mental concepts. For example, one specific
saccade can be mapped onto both the mental concepts close and left-of.
Also, two different saccades can both be mapped onto the same concept, for
example, left-of.
Mapping of mental concepts onto perceptual actions: Mental
concepts can be fully or partially identified. Imagine, for example, that
square is partially identified when three out of four edges with respective
relative locations and orientations are already known.
The currently identified or partially identified mental concepts and the
temporarily available corresponding perceptual information determine the
perceptual action that will be executed next. This step is realized by the
other mapping provided by the VS-LTM: the mapping of mental concepts
onto perceptual actions. It is assumed that the strategy of choosing a percep-
tual action in a given situation follows the principle of maximum information
gain. That is, the strategy is to choose that perceptual action which is ex-
pected to give the maximum gain of information about what the perceived
object or scene is. Such strategies are considered in vision research for scene
and object recognition (e.g., Schill, Umkehrer, Beinlich, Krieger, & Zetzsche,
2001). For the example of the partially identified mental concept square, i.e.,
the location and orientation of three edges have already been perceived, the
next perceptual action would be an attention shift towards an anticipated
fourth edge to gather support for the hypothesis that the object in question
is indeed a square. This attention shift might be another saccade. The plan-
ning of that saccade takes into account the available perceptual information
of the already known edges. That is, the to-be-attended-to fourth edge is
anticipated to have a location and orientation fitting with the already known
edges. The saccade is then executed towards this specific location. Given
that the edge is found at the respective location, the next chosen perceptual
action would retrieve the orientation and other visual features. The per-
ceptual feedback, i.e., the location provided by the saccade and information
about the orientation, lead to the full identification of the mental concept
square.
The mapping of mental concepts onto perceptual actions is also a many-
to-many mapping. That is, one mental concept can be identified by several
different (sets of) perceptual actions and different mental concepts can be
identified by employing the same perceptual actions. For example, to check
for the fourth edge of a square, both an appropriate saccade and an appropri-
ate head movement are possible. Furthermore, information about distance
as well as information about direction between two given objects can be
retrieved by the same perceptual action such as a saccade.
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Figure 3.1: Example of the mapping of perceptual information onto men-
tal concepts by the VS-LTM. The top (labeled (a)) shows a set of objects
(O1, . . . , O5) in a coordinate system representing the visual field. The dashed
arrows represent attention shifts such as saccades made between the objects
during visual perception. Each of these attention shifts yields information
about the starting and ending coordinates. The relative shift between these
coordinates can be represented by a vector. For example, a saccade from the
coordinates (2,3) to the coordinates (3,4) can be represented by the vector
v = (1, 1) = (3, 4)− (2, 3). These resulting vectors are mapped onto mental
concepts such as spatial relations. Two examples of spatial relations are
shown in the lower part of the figure (labeled (b) and (c)): close and left-of.
These mappings can be imagined as a check whether a vector, that repre-
sents the respective attention shift, falls into a set of points that corresponds
to the respective mental concept. For example, the concept close is defined
by the region of points in blue. An attention shift falls into this region when
it does not exceed a certain length, that is, when the distance between two
objects is not larger than that certain length. A red vector indicates the
lack of recognition whereas a green vector indicates the recognition of the
mental concept. For example, it can be seen that an attention shift from O3
to O4 would trigger the recognition that O3 is left of O4 as well as that O3
is close to O4.
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3.1.4 Perceptual Actions
It is an assumption of PIT that almost all perception is mediated by and
thereby connected to respective perceptual actions. Examples of perceptual
actions of visual perception include saccades, micro-saccades, head and body
movements, adjusting the focal length of the lens as well as covert actions
such as covert attention shifts. Different types of information are retrieved
using different perceptual actions. For example, information about locations
and spatial relations can be retrieved by saccades, while smooth pursuit is
used to track the movement of an object, and adjusting the focal length of
our lenses gives information about depth.
Covert and Overt Attention Shifts
Many perceptual actions fall into the category of attention shifts, for ex-
ample, all different kinds of eye movement can be understood as attention
shifts. Two general types of attention shifts are distinguished: covert and
overt attention shifts. The latter include all sorts of observable eye move-
ments, such as saccades, micro-saccades, head and body movements (which
indirectly move the gaze). Covert attention shifts are those attention shifts
which are not directly observable. For example, while keeping our gaze fix-
ated at a certain point, we can still shift our attention to another point in
the periphery of our gaze. Such covert attention shifts have been interpreted
as part of the planning of overt attention shifts as they usually precede a
respective saccade (Theeuwes, Belopolsky, & Olivers, 2009). Covert atten-
tion shifts have been shown to be sufficient on their own instead of overt
attention shifts as an aid in problem solving (Thomas & Lleras, 2009). This
makes sense because the information of a saccade, i.e., specifically the start
and ending coordinates, are necessarily already provided by the planning of
it. In order to execute a saccade the respective muscles must be controlled
so that the gaze actually ends up near the goal position. For this control the
information of the goal position in space must be available on some level.
The planning of an overt attention shift can thus similarly be used to provide
feedback that can then be mapped onto respective mental concepts.
3.1.5 Mental Concepts
The memory of a previously perceived scene corresponds to a conceptual de-
scription of that scene in conceptual long-term memory (C-LTM). Concep-
tual descriptions consist of mental concepts. Mental concepts include spatial
relations (e.g., left-of, close), objects (e.g., square, house), and properties
(e.g., red, big). The C-LTM comprises all mental concepts and associative
links between them. The C-LTM can be understood as what is often referred
to as declarative or associative memory (Anderson, 2005). The mental con-
cepts of PIT have two important properties: 1) they are grounded symbols
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and 2) they incorporate input from all modalities. These two properties will
be elaborated in the following.
The mental concepts of PIT are grounded symbols in that they func-
tion as hubs linking to perceptual actions. The linked perceptual actions
are those which are used for the perception of the entity that the respec-
tive mental concept represents. That is, for example, the mental concept
of the relation left of comprises the different ways of perceiving the rela-
tion left of such as certain eye movements, hand movements, attending to
certain sound patterns, and hearing the words “left of” in a sentence. The
so-defined mental concepts of PIT differ from symbols as often used in cogni-
tive science and artificial intelligence (for example, ACT-R (Anderson et al.,
2004), physical symbol system (Newell, 1990), or mentalese (Fodor, 1975)),
because 1) they do not contain the semantics of the entity they represent,
and 2) they do not directly reflect properties of the entity they represent.
The semantics of a mental concept, that is, what the mental concept means
to the organism, corresponds not to the processing or the activation of the
mental concept, but the semantics are manifested in the process of executing
the linked perception actions. That is, the semantics of an entity are the
perception of that entity, i.e., what seeing, touching, or otherwise perceiv-
ing the entity is like. The mental concepts also do not directly reflect the
properties of the represented entity. Consider, for example, that a depictive
mental representation of an entity does preserve and thus reflect properties
of the represented entity (e.g., Kosslyn, 1994). The properties of an entity
instead become available by the perceptual feedback of the perceptual ac-
tions in visual perception. In mental imagery, as it will be discussed later,
the employment of the linked perceptual action generates a perceptual in-
stance of the represented entity which makes some of the properties of the
entity available.
A set of mental concepts describing a scene incorporates the input of all
modalities. That is, the perception of, for example, a cheese contains not
only the visual and spatial information of it conveyed via visual perception
but also the smell that was perceived and its texture and feel when it was
touched. The resulting mental concepts of the perception through the dif-
ferent modalities are combined in one final conceptual description of that
cheese. Importantly, also subtle and fully subconscious information such
as that communicated via different demand or task characteristics (Orne,
1962) is assumed to be included in the final conceptual description. The
different modalities can also give conflicting input as in, for example, the
McGurk effect (McGurk & MacDonald, 1976). The McGurk effect is an ex-
ample of sensory integration. When seeing a video of someone saying “ga”
without sound but at the same time hearing the sound “ba”, we perceive
the person in the video actually saying “da” which is a mixture of those two
sounds. Conflicting mental concepts can be part of the conceptual descrip-
tion of a scene. When this conceptual description is processed during the
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mental imagination of the scene, these conflicting mental concepts might be
integrated to make the mental image of the scene consistent.
From the above definition of mental concepts, it follows that mental
concepts are not independent of the organism’s body as the linked perceptual
actions are specific to the perception and action capabilities of the body.
3.1.6 Additional Aspects of Visual Perception
Top-Down and Bottom-Up Control
The employment of perceptual actions can both be triggered top-down and
bottom-up. A bottom-up triggered perceptual action is, for example, a
saccade that is automatically made towards a moving or otherwise salient
object. The execution of that saccade yields perceptual information which is
mapped onto mental concepts and influences the selection of the next (top-
down triggered) perceptual action. Another way that perceptual actions
are guided bottom-up is when they adjust and correct a top-down triggered
perceptual action. For example, if three edges of what is presumably a
square are already known, an attention shift is executed in order to find the
fourth edge. The attention shift is made towards the anticipated location of
the fourth edge according to the available perceptual information and the
general knowledge of what a square looks like. This anticipated location
might not be accurate enough or actually fit with the stimulus at hand, so
that the attention shift is corrected bottom-up via, for example, detecting
the edge in the periphery of one’s gaze.
A top-down triggered perceptual action is one that is selected based on
the currently identified and partially identified mental concepts and their
corresponding perceptual information.
Interpretation
The iterative process of selecting perceptual actions, executing them to re-
trieve perceptual information, and identifying mental concepts from the
perceptual information results in a set of identified mental concepts and
corresponding perceptual information. From this set of identified mental
concepts a subset is drawn as the interpretation of what is “seen”. This
interpretation is usually one out of several possible descriptions of the per-
ceived scene. The selected interpretation is the most plausible and coherent
alternative out of all possible ones. This decision is based on the individual
background knowledge and the current situation. The interpretation pro-
cess, furthermore, considers not only the modality of visual perception but
the currently available information of all modalities. Figure 3.2 depicts an
example of an ambiguous stimulus and its interpretation.
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Figure 3.2: Interpretation of an ambiguous stimulus. The stimulus on the
left can be seen as a schematized house or as a triangle on top of a square.
An interpretation is drawn based on the identified mental concepts. Which
interpretation is chosen depends on the context. For example, on a map for
wayfinding, the house is more plausible, whereas the alternative interpreta-
tion is more plausible for a drawing about geometry.
Short-Term Memory
The short-term memory keeps the currently (partially and fully) identified
mental concepts, the gathered perceptual information and the current inter-
pretation of what is perceived. The perceptual information includes specifi-
cally the coordinates of the recognized entities and the spatial relations in an
ego-centric reference frame. The short-term memory as proposed here de-
scribes a mental representation that is in parts functionally similar to other
short-term memory structures such as ego-centric perceptual maps (Wang
& Spelke, 2002; Sholl, 2001) or the visual cache as an assumed passive visual
store in visuo-spatial working memory (Logie, 2003).
3.2 Mental Imagery
This section will present how PIT understands the underlying mechanisms of
mental imagery. First, the relationship between mental imagery and visual
perception is elaborated.
3.2.1 How Mental Imagery Relates to Visual Perception
This section will give an overview of how mental imagery relates to and
builds upon the processes and representations of visual perception. First, I
will summarize the process of visual perception.
Figure 3.3 gives a schematic overview of the visual perception of a scene.
The recognition of a scene is realized through the dynamic interplay of choos-
ing a perceptual action and retrieving the respective perceptual informa-
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tion it yields. The retrieved perceptual information is then used to identify
mental concepts based on the gathered perceptual information. The identi-
fied mental concepts and the available perceptual information determine the
choice of the next perceptual action. From the set of all identified mental
concepts, one consistent and most plausible subset is drawn. This subset is
the interpretation of what is perceived. Finally, this interpretation is stored
in long-term memory. However, in long-term memory the interpretation
is abstracted from the perceptual information and only the set of mental
concepts is stored. That is, the (long-term) memory of a perceived scene
includes a conceptual description such as “red small square” but not the
concrete details of the perception such as the actual size, shade of red, or
location of the square.
The process of mental imagery can be thought of as the task to (re-)create
a set of perceptual information for the set of mental concepts that describe
the scene or object that is to be imagined. In other words, mental imagery
is the process of (re-)creating one instance of perceptual information for a
given conceptual description. For every conceptual description there are
several possible instances of perceptual information, because the conceptual
description is an abstraction. For example, squares of marginally different
sizes, orientations, and colors might all be abstracted to the same conceptual
description “small red square”.
Figure 3.4 depicts the process of generating a mental image. The pro-
cess of mental imagery starts with a conceptual description of what is to
be imagined. That is, mental imagery starts with the end product of vi-
sual perception. A conceptual description of a scene consists of a set of
mental concepts such as house, left of, tree. As discussed in Section 3.1.5
mental concepts consist of links to those perceptual actions which are used
to identify the mental concepts, i.e., they are used to look at that thing
which the respective mental concept represents. In mental imagery these
links from mental concepts to perceptual actions are used to create an in-
stance of perceptual information that corresponds to the respective set of
mental concepts. The mental concepts are successively mapped onto per-
ceptual actions which are then executed either overtly, e.g., spontaneous
eye movements, or covertly. The execution yields perceptual information,
for example, information about the change of gaze position. This process
of picking and employing perceptual actions for a given mental concept in
order to retrieve perceptual information is referred to as instantiation.
The term instantiation is used because the perceptual information which
is made available by the employment of perceptual actions represents one
(perceptual) instance of the mental concepts that conceptually describe the
mental image. The perceptual information made available through instanti-
ation is mapped onto mental concepts by the VS-LTM just as it is the case
in visual perception. The perceptual information and the mental concepts
that have been identified based on it, influence the instantiation of further
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mental concepts. Again, similar to visual perception, from all identified
mental concepts and their respective perceptual information, an interpreta-
tion is drawn and held in short-term memory. The interpretation is the most
plausible subset of all identified mental concepts with their perceptual infor-
mation. This interpretation in short-term memory constitutes the mental
image. The perceptual information of the mental image held in short-term
memory can be used for further processing, e.g., inferring new information
such as previously not identified spatial relations.
Mental imagery understood as described above is very similar to what is
often described as simulation in the context of embodied and grounded cog-
nition. For example, it is proposed that word and sentence comprehension
is realized by respective simulations of the described objects and situations
in terms of how they are perceived and which affordances they offer (e.g.,
Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Kaup, Yaxley, Madden, Zwaan, & Luedtke,
2007) and sometimes it is even assumed that all cognition comprises such
simulations (e.g. Hesslow, 2012).
3.2.2 Instantiation: Parsimony and Context-Sensitivity
During mental imagery mental concepts are successively mapped onto per-
ceptual actions using the mappings of the VS-LTM. Given that these map-
pings are many-to-many mappings, a single mental concept can be mapped
onto several different perceptual actions. Consider, for example, the spatial
relation left-of which can be mapped onto several different overt and covert
attention shifts. Which perceptual action is chosen depends on several fac-
tors.
One factor is parsimony: mental imagery is assumed to be an economic
process. That is, to instantiate a mental concept, perceptual actions are
chosen so that they require a minimum of (motor) effort to perform. For
example, in order to mentally imagine a scene described as “A left of B”
the spatial relation left-of can be instantiated using a covert attention shift
rather than a longer and more expensive saccade. Using shorter attention
shifts also means that less time is taken (the timing of perceptual actions is
discussed later in Section 3.2.4). Mental imagery is, furthermore, economic
with respect to which mental concepts are instantiated. That is, a mental
concept is instantiated on demand when required. It is therefore possible
that some mental concepts of the description of a given scene are not in-
stantiated at all. For example, given the task “The house is left of the tree
and the person is left of the house; what is the relation between the person
and the tree?”, it is not necessary to instantiate the shapes of any of the
entities to solve the task and therefore visual details will not be instantiated
to the same degree as for tasks in which shape is relevant such as “Is the
tree higher than the house?”.
Another factor that determines the choice of perceptual actions for a
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given mental concept is the context in which a mental concept is to be instan-
tiated. The context consists of the other mental concepts of the conceptual
description of the to-be-imagined scene and the perceptual information of
any already instantiated mental concepts. If the conceptual description of a
scene contains not only left-of but other mental concepts further describing
the spatial relation such as close or far, these are considered for the instan-
tiation of the spatial relation. That is, left-of, far is generally mapped onto
a perceptual action such as an attention shift that is longer than for left-of,
close. Already available perceptual information such as the extent of a shape
can also influence which perceptual action a mental concept is mapped onto.
If the reference object of the relation left-of has some extent (i.e., perceptual
information about its shape has been instantiated), it influences what left-of
concretely means in this context, i.e., when we imagine something being left
of a tiny object the relation left-of has a different concrete distance than
when we imagine something being left of a huge object.
Apart from context-sensitivity and parsimony, mental concepts are mapped
onto perceptual actions so that prototypical1 perceptual actions are chosen.
That is, without any further information left-of would not be mapped onto
any of the extreme cases, i.e., very short of very long distance attention
shifts, but onto an attention shift of prototypical length and direction.
3.2.3 Perceptual Information and Bodily Feedback
The employment of perceptual actions yields perceptual information which is
mapped onto mental concepts. This section discusses what such perceptual
information is. I will first focus on visual perception and afterwards discuss
the consequences for mental imagery.
I distinguish between three types of perceptual information that result
from the employment of perceptual actions during visual perception. The
first type is information that directly depends on the stimulus. That is, for
example, if one focusses on an object, the photoreceptor cells on the retina
fire according to the different wavelengths of the light particles emitted by
that object. Much of this activation is transferred to the early visual ar-
eas of the occipital lobe and causes the activation of neural representations
selective to, among other information, the existence of edges, their orienta-
tion, and location (Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2009). This information is
directly caused by the perceived object because the activation is caused by
the light emitted by the object.
The second type of perceptual information is bodily feedback, specif-
ically, proprioception. This type of perceptual information only indirectly
depends on the stimulus as it is derived from the state one’s body is in when
perceiving the object. Some of the ways we perceive depth are good exam-
1Prototypical with respect to the experience of the individual
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ples for this kind of feedback. Figure 3.5 shows and explains an example of
proprioceptive feedback which yields information about depth, i.e., how far
an object is away from the observer. Another example of depth perception
is the focal length of the lenses in our eyes. In order to put an object in
focus the lenses have to be adapted to the distance of the object just like the
lens of a camera. The change in focal length of the lenses is realized by a set
of respective muscles. It follows that the state of these muscles corresponds
to the distance between the object and the observer. Similar to these ex-
amples, attention shifts such as all types of eye movements, head and body
movements provide bodily feedback through the resulting positional change
of the gaze. The position of one’s gaze depends on the positions of one’s
eyes, head, and body which are derived through appropriate proprioceptive
feedback.
The third type of perceptual information made available by the employ-
ment of perceptual actions is information that is neurally encoded during the
preparation or planning of a perceptual action. This information also does
not directly depend on the stimulus. An eye movement such as a saccade is
not made randomly but planned. Generally, the planning of attention shifts
requires knowledge how to engage one’s muscles in order to move one’s at-
tention, e.g., one’s gaze, to the desired position. That is, the desired position
has to be known on some level. Information about the next planned gaze
position has been found to be encoded in different neural representations, for
example, the frontal eye fields (Schall & Hanes, 1993). Information such as
the current and next position of one’s gaze can yield information about the
(anticipated) metrical properties of the object that is currently inspected as
well as spatial relations that hold between inspected objects. Section 3.1.3
already discussed how spatial relations can be identified based on atten-
tion shifts. Covert perceptual actions might generally correspond to the
planning of respective overt perceptual actions as it is theorized for covert
attention shifts (Section 3.1.4 also discussed this aspect of covert attention
shifts). Further evidence from different neuroimaging studies indicates that
such covert actions comprise the planning of overt actions with the actual
execution of the action being cancelled (for a summary, see Hesslow, 2012).
For mental imagery it is obvious that the employment of perceptual ac-
tions can lead to at least the second type of perceptual information (for
overtly executed perceptual actions) and the third type of perceptual in-
formation (for covertly executed perceptual actions), because these types
of perceptual information do not necessarily depend on the presence of an
actual stimulus. It is, however, possible that also perceptual information of
the first type is made available by the employment of perceptual actions if
these perceptual actions trigger a recurrent top-down activation of low-level
neural representations in early visual cortex. Note that the pictorial theory
assumes that exactly the first type of perceptual information is recurrently
activated as a pattern of neural activation in the early visual areas of the
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Figure 3.5: The figure depicts the convergence depth cue in binocular vision.
The leftmost part shows the position of the eyeballs when the horizon is
fixated. The middle part shows the fixation on an object at a medium
distance and the rightmost part shows the fixation on an object at close
distance. The angle between the gaze direction when an object is fixated
and the direction when the eyes look straight ahead depends on the distance
of the object. This angle is controlled by a set of respective muscles so that
their current state corresponds to the distance between the fixated object
and the observer.
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occipital lobe (see Section 2.2.1 for more details on the pictorial theory).
Neuroimaging studies have found contradicting results with respect to ac-
tivation of these early visual areas during mental imagery (e.g., Kosslyn &
Thompson, 2003; Mellet, Petit, Mazoyer, Denis, & Tzourio, 1998). Neu-
ropsychological data, however, clearly shows that damage to the occipital
lobe (which includes the early visual areas in question) is neither sufficient
nor necessary for deficits in mental imagery (Bartolomeo, 2002; Bridge et
al., 2012).
PIT accordingly assumes that the perceptual information of the second
and third type, i.e., bodily feedback and anticipation, is used for the instan-
tiation of mental concepts in mental imagery. Given this understanding,
mental imagery critically relies also on non-neural states and feedback of
the body.
3.2.4 The Spatio-Analogical Character of Mental Imagery
It is a well-supported finding that mental imagery generally exhibits similar
reaction time patterns as visual perception. For example, in both visual
perception and mental imagery it is generally the case that the time to
scan over a distance increases roughly linearly with the length of that dis-
tance, the time to inspect a stimulus increases for small stimuli, and the
perception or inspection of a set of objects takes longer the more objects are
present (Kosslyn, 1980); also see Section 2.1.1 on mental scanning. It was
these findings that first motivated the proposal of spatio-analogical mental
representations for mental imagery (for a summary, see Kosslyn, 1980).
Because mental imagery is assumed to employ the same perceptual ac-
tions as visual perception, PIT accounts for these similarities in a trivial
way and without appeal to specifically structured mental representations.
The timing patterns of different perceptual actions determine the timing of
both visual perception and mental imagery.
It is worth noting that these timing patterns persist even when percep-
tual actions are not executed overtly, such as spontaneous eye movements
during mental imagery, but covertly, such as shifting attention within the
periphery of one’s gaze. Covert execution of perceptual actions is assumed
to at least include the planning phase of the respective overt perceptual ac-
tion (see Section 3.1.4), while the final overt behavior is not executed. The
timing patterns of the planning phase of an overt perceptual action thus
persists for covert perceptual actions. Thomas (1999) and Hesslow (2012)2
both generally make the assumption that the timing patterns between overt
and covert actions show comparable temporal properties. Summarizing, this
means that the spatio-analogical character of mental imagery does not re-
sult from the properties of an internal mental representation but from the
2In (Hesslow, 2012) this assumption refers to the case of conscious simulations, i.e.,
mental imagery.
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properties of the employed perceptual actions which are generally directed
at external stimuli. Consequently, it is the physical properties of the visual
apparatus or more generally the body that constrain the temporal properties
of not only vision but also mental imagery.
3.2.5 Reasoning with Mental Images
Reasoning with mental images is realized by the top-down employment of
perceptual actions based on the perceptual information of the mental image.
As stated before a saccade between two objects yields perceptual informa-
tion about the spatial relations that hold between these objects. In a similar
way, new information can be inferred not based on actual stimuli but the
perceptual information of a mental image. For example, to infer the spatial
relation between two entities in a mental image, the perceptual information
of their (imagined) locations is used to trigger a top-down attention shift
from one location to the other. This attention shift yields new perceptual
information which is mapped onto mental concepts just as if that atten-
tion shift was executed during visual perception. The so identified mental
concept could be a spatial relation which was not explicit before.
3.2.6 Differences between Mental Imagery and Visual Per-
ception
Mental imagery and visual perception both employ the VS-LTM and the
same perceptual actions, yet, there are some important differences between
the two processes. In the following, two important differences are elaborated.
Note that, Section 3.2.3 already discussed a third important difference be-
tween mental imagery and visual perception with respect to the types of
perceptual information that are used in perception and imagery.
Interpretation
The interpretation process of visual perception selects a subset of the set of
all identified mental concepts with their respective perceptual information
(see Section 3.1.6). This subset is selected so that it forms the currently
most plausible and coherent description of what is presumably perceived.
This interpretation is abstracted as only the mental concepts without their
respective perceptual information are stored in conceptual long-term mem-
ory. This end product of visual perception is also the starting point of the
mental imagery process: the conceptual description of a scene is retrieved
from conceptual long-term memory and held in short-term memory. The
mental concepts of that description are then instantiated as described in
Section 3.2.2. In mental imagery an interpretation from the set of all iden-
tified mental concepts with the respective perceptual information is drawn
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similarly to visual perception. This interpretation corresponds to the men-
tal image. That is, if the task is to form a mental image of a certain scene,
this includes the interpretation to be the conceptual description of the given
scene. Accordingly, there can be no mental image without an interpreta-
tion fitting with the imagery task. If a second alternative interpretation of a
mental image is to be found (e.g., in mental reinterpretation tasks), then this
alternative interpretation will have to “overwrite” the initial interpretation.
In contrast, an ambiguous stimulus can be inspected in visual perception
“from scratch”, i.e., without the necessity of a previous interpretation.
Attention
In contrast to visual perception, attention is not influenced bottom-up in
mental imagery. In visual perception, a salient object in the periphery can
draw attention and trigger a bottom-up attention shift towards it. In mental
imagery, these types of bottom-up triggered attention shifts do not happen
because there is no unexpected information, such as a suddenly appearing
object. All perceptual information created during mental imagery is the re-
sult of the application of perceptual actions which have been chosen based on
the mental concepts that describe the mental image. That is, all attention
shifts that are executed as a result of the instantiation of mental concepts
during mental imagery are top-down triggered attention shifts. Also atten-
tion shifts executed to infer new information from a mental image are based
on the perceptual information that was made available through the instan-
tiation of the mental concepts. That is, the starting and ending coordinates
of the attention shifts are taken from the perceptual information and the
attention shifts are therefore triggered top-down.
65
66
Chapter 4
A Formal Framework of PIT
This section presents a formalization of the perceptual instantiation the-
ory (PIT). First, the core commitments of PIT are summarized. Based on
these, the processes involved in visuo-spatial mental imagery are described
formally. Lastly, PIT is compared to the three contemporary theories so
that differences and similarities between PIT and the other theories become
clear.
4.1 Core Commitments of PIT
The following summarizes the core commitments of PIT based on its de-
scription in Chapter 3:
• Mental concepts: mental images are based on mental concepts. Mental
concepts are abstracted conceptual descriptions. A mental concept is
grounded in those perceptual actions that are used to recognize the
entity the mental concept represents (see Section 3.1.5).
• Visuo-spatial long-term memory (VS-LTM): visual perception is con-
trolled by the procedural knowledge of how perceptual information
maps onto mental concepts and how mental concepts map onto per-
ceptual actions (see Section 3.1.3).
• Instantiation: during mental imagery the mental concepts describing
a scene are instantiated with one concrete instance of perceptual in-
formation (see Section 3.2.2).
• Perceptual information: perceptual information is generated during
mental imagery by the (overt or covert) employment of perceptual
actions. Perceptual information is conveyed via bodily feedback, i.e.,
proprioception, and anticipation, i.e., neural encodings of (planned)
perceptual actions (see Section 3.2.3).
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• Identification: perceptual information is mapped onto mental concepts
using the mapping of the VS-LTM, i.e., mental concepts are identified
based on the available perceptual information (see Section 3.2.2).
• Interpretation: in visual perception and mental imagery an interpre-
tation is drawn from the set of all identified mental concepts and their
respective instances of perceptual information. This interpretation
represent the most plausible alternative of all subsets. In visual per-
ception the interpretation corresponds to what is consciously perceived
(see Section 3.1.6).
• Mental image: in mental imagery this interpretation, i.e., the sub-
set drawn from all identified mental concepts together with their in-
stance of perceptual information, constitutes the mental image (see
Section 3.2.1).
• Spatio-analogical character: the temporal properties of visuo-spatial
mental imagery are similar to those of visual perception because the
same perceptual actions are employed in both perception and imagery.
The temporal properties of these perceptual actions are determined by
the physical properties of the human visual system. (see Section 3.2.4).
4.2 Formal Framework of PIT
In this section the process of generating a mental image, that is, the imag-
ination of a scene from long-term memory, is described within a formal
framework. The framework is intended to clarify the principles underlying
the process of mental imagery. This means that the process is broken down
into functions. These functions and the operands they process will be de-
scribed regarding their functionality, i.e., what purpose they serve and what
they represent. Chapter 3 discussed these aspects on a theoretical level with
respect to the theoretical and empirical psychological literature. Here, the
discussion will focus on making clear how these aspects can be understood
from a formal perspective.
4.2.1 Functions
I will start with the operands on which the functions of mental imagery
operate. These are 1) perceptual information, 2) perceptual actions, and 3)
mental concepts.
Perceptual information are the low-level features the human visual
system can perceive. For example, edges, orientation and location of edges,
brightness, and color.
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Perceptual actions are the basic actions of the human visual sys-
tem. For example, eye movements, head movements, adjusting the lens,
and covert attention shifts.
Perceptual information and perceptual actions are intimately connected
in two ways. First, perceptual actions are used to retrieve perceptual infor-
mation from the environment. Second, they are connected through mental
concepts. Mental concepts are associative hubs linking perceptual infor-
mation and perceptual actions. They are identified when a certain com-
bination of perceptual information has been perceived. For example, the
mental concept square is identified when the features of a square have been
perceived, e.g., four edges in a certain arrangement. The recognition of a
square in visual perception corresponds to the full identification of the men-
tal concept square. Furthermore, a mental concept links to those perceptual
actions which are used to perceive these defining features.
Through this mapping of perceptual information to mental concepts and
the mapping of mental concepts to perceptual actions, a top-down guided
active perception is realized. For example, the perception of three edges trig-
gers the (partial) identification of the mental concept square. The mental
concept then provides the respective perceptual action to test for the exis-
tence of a further fitting edge to confirm the hypothesis of a square being
present.
Figure 4.1 depicts these relationships between perceptual information,
perceptual actions, and mental concepts. The figure contains the three
functions that realize these relationships: 1) execute, 2) identify, and
3) select. These functions are elaborated in the following.
The function execute represents the execution of a perceptual action by
the visual/motor system. The execution of a perceptual action yields per-
ceptual information. The time of executing a perceptual action depends on
the physical constraints of the visual/motor system. Both overt and covert
perceptual actions can be executed. Overt perceptual actions include specif-
ically spontaneous eye movements. The function execute has to include a
mechanism to decide whether a perceptual action is to be executed overtly
or covertly.
The function identify identifies or partially identifies mental concepts
based on the newly retrieved and previously retrieved perceptual informa-
tion.
The function select then selects the next to-be-executed perceptual ac-
tion based on the identified mental concepts as well as the available per-
ceptual information. For example, consider a saccade towards the location
of an anticipated fourth edge of a presumed square. The mental concept
square provides the perceptual action to check for a fourth edge while the
current perceptual information, e.g., the location and distance between the
already perceived edges, is used to adjust the perceptual action so that the
edge is checked for in the “correct” location. The selection of a perceptual
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Figure 4.1: The cyclic process of select-execute-identify used during visual
perception for object and scene recognition and during mental imagery for
the instantiation of mental concepts. The cyclic process comprises 1) the
selection of a perceptual action based on the identified mental concepts and
available perceptual information; 2) the execution of the perceptual action to
retrieve further perceptual information; and 3) the identification of mental
concepts based on the available perceptual information.
action is subject to the principle of parsimony (see Section 3.2.2).
Now that the functions that govern the relationships between perceptual
information, perceptual actions, and mental concepts have been clarified,
they can be embedded into a large picture including the components of the
framework of PIT. Figure 4.2 depicts this framework which also incorpo-
rates the functions and operands of Figure 4.1. The figure contains two
additional functions: 1) retrieve, and 2) interpret. These are discussed in
the following.
The function retrieve retrieves a set of mental concepts from conceptual
long-term memory. This set of mental concepts is the conceptual descrip-
tion of the to-be-imagined scene. These mental concepts are used to start
the cyclic process of select-execute-identify until at some point the func-
tion interpret selects a subset of mental concepts with their instantiation
of perceptual information, i.e., the perceptual information generated by the
perceptual actions that were selected based on these mental concepts. This
subset is the interpretation of what is perceived in the case of visual per-
ception and of what is imagined in the case of mental imagery. That is, the
mental image is constituted by the drawn subset of mental concepts and
their instances of perceptual information.
The function interpret selects what is considered the most plausible
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Figure 4.2: The formal framework of PIT. The mental imagination of a
scene starts with 1) the retrieval of a set of mental concepts from C-LTM
which conceptually describe the scene; 2) these mental concepts are suc-
cessively instantiated with perceptual information by the cyclic process of
select-execute-identify; 3) an interpretation is drawn from all identified men-
tal concepts with their instances of perceptual information; 4) this interpre-
tation constitutes the mental image of the scene.
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subset. For example, a set of perceptual information might correspond to
both the mental concepts square and triangle as well as to a (schematic)
house. Then the interpretation whether one “sees” a house or two geometric
shapes depends on what is most plausible given the current situation and
the background knowledge.
The components of the framework are 1) conceptual long-term memory
(C-LTM), 2) short-term memory (STM), 3) visuo-spatial long-term memory
(VS-LTM), and 4) visual/motor system. TheC-LTM is the long-term mem-
ory of conceptual information. It consists of the set of all mental concepts.
The STM temporarily holds perceptual information and mental concepts
relevant to the current process of perception or imagery as well as the mental
image. The VS-LTM holds the procedural knowledge of how to interact
with the environment in order to recognize familiar objects and relations.
This procedural knowledge is represented by 1) a mapping of mental con-
cepts onto perceptual actions realized by the function select and 2) a map-
ping of perceptual information onto mental concepts realized by the function
identify. The visual/motor system represents the human visual system
which executes perceptual actions to retrieve perceptual information.
4.3 Comparison to the Contemporary Theories
In the following PIT is compared to the three contemporary theories of
mental imagery (see Section 2.2 for a summary of the three theories).
4.3.1 The Pictorial Theory
The comparison of PIT to the pictorial theory is presented along three main
questions for which the two theories give different answers. These questions
are: 1) what type of information is stored in long-term memory that is
retrieved and used to generate a mental image?; 2) what type of low-level
perceptual information does a mental image comprise?; and 3) how does the
spatio-analogical character of mental imagery come about?
What Information is Stored?
PIT is similar to the pictorial theory in that it also assumes that mental
imagery makes previously implicit information explicit. It does, however,
differ with respect to what this implicit information is.
In the pictorial theory the initially implicit information are the encoded
mental percepts which are made explicit through a representation of them
in the visual buffer. Once the depictive mental image is generated in the
visual buffer, it is inspected by the same processes that process content of the
visual buffer during visual perception. This inspection can yield information
formerly not accessible. For example, in order to recall the shape of Snoopy’s
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ears, the encoded percept of Snoopy is retrieved and decoded by placing it
in the visual buffer to then “read off” the required information.
In contrast, no percept of Snoopy would be stored in PIT, but instead
Snoopy’s shape is indirectly described by the procedural knowledge of how
the mental concepts describing Snoopy are linked to perceptual actions. The
execution of those perceptual actions then creates an instance of perceptual
information corresponding to the shape of Snoopy.
In a way, PIT takes a shortcut by leaving out the depictive mental per-
cept which is mentally inspected and, instead, directly utilizing the processes
of inspection themselves without a mental percept that is to-be-inspected.
In this sense, PIT can be seen as a more parsimonious version of the pic-
torial theory. However, the inspection mechanisms posed by PIT are quite
different to those of the pictorial theory. This difference is rooted in the
different assumptions of the two theories about visual perception. The pic-
torial theory assumes that both visual perception and mental imagery rely
on the same processes which are employed to process content of the visual
buffer. These processes are different than the perceptual actions proposed
by PIT, because perceptual actions are employed not to process an inner
mental representation but are directed at external stimuli. The pictorial
theory further assumes an inspection mechanism which relies on matching
the content of the visual buffer against the stored mental percepts. Whereas
PIT assumes that perception and recognition are the result of the successful
application of different specific perceptual actions to the external stimulus.
What Low-Level Perceptual Information Does a Mental Image
Consist of?
Another difference between PIT and the pictorial theory is the type of in-
formation that is assumed to make up the mental images. In the pictorial
theory it is low-level information of early visual areas which is recurrently ac-
tivated during mental imagery. This information corresponds to the (partly)
depictive information that is transferred from the retina into the visual cor-
tex during visual perception. PIT does not rely on this type of low-level
information although it does not claim that such information might not
somehow be recurrently activated, but it specifically poses that propriocep-
tive feedback of executed perceptual actions as well as information made
available through covert perceptual actions makes up mental images (see
Section 3.2.3 for more details on this distinction of low-level information).
Accordingly, the pictorial theory emphasizes the functional involvement of
modality-specific mental representations in mental imagery whereas PIT em-
phasizes the functional involvement of processes of sensorimotor interaction
with the environment as constitutive of mental imagery.
The pictorial theory, furthermore, poses that the depictive mental per-
cepts that are stored in long-term memory constitute the mental image once
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they are encoded and placed in the visual buffer. That is, these percept-like
memories are the low-level perceptual information that the mental image
consists of. In contrast, in PIT the low-level perceptual information that
makes up the mental image is not stored at all, but has to be actively “cre-
ated” by the employment of respective perceptual actions.
Where Does the Spatio-Analogical Character of Mental Imagery
Come From?
In the pictorial theory, it is (to a large extent) the spatial properties of the
mental image in the spatio-analogical visual buffer that give rise to the fact
that mental imagery shares many properties with visual perception. To be
clearer, because the mental image is similar to an actual image, i.e., the
mental representation preserves metrical properties, mental imagery shows
behavioral similarities to visual perception. In contrast, PIT poses that the
spatio-analogical character of mental imagery is determined by the char-
acteristics of the perceptual actions. The perceptual actions are physically
constrained by our visual system, e.g., to which extent and with which speed
we can execute a saccade is limited by our body’s ability to move our eyeballs
in both visual perception and mental imagery.
4.3.2 The Descriptive Theory
PIT is compared to the descriptive theory with respect to two aspects: the
symbolic descriptions and the tacit knowledge.
Mental Concepts vs. Amodal Symbols
The descriptive theory poses that mental imagery does not require a specific
mental representation, but that it can be realized using the same type of ab-
stract descriptions that it assumes for other cognitive functions. This means
that mental images are fully represented in an amodal and non-analogical
format using symbolic descriptions. There are two critical differences be-
tween the symbolic descriptions of the descriptive theory and the mental
concepts of PIT. First, in contrast to the descriptive theory, the mental con-
cepts of PIT are not amodal. As described in Section 3.1.5, they consist of
links to perceptual actions of several modalities. Second, in PIT a mental
image is not fully represented by its conceptual description, i.e., the men-
tal concepts. Instead, the mental concepts describing a given mental image
only form the basis for the selection of respective perceptual actions whose
execution then creates the perceptual content of the mental image, i.e., in-
stances of perceptual information for the given mental concepts. That is,
in order to imagine a square the execution of perceptual actions which the
mental concept square links to is necessary.
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Procedural Knowledge vs. Tacit Knowledge
The tacit knowledge proposed by the descriptive theory serves the purpose
of explaining why we show similar behavior in mental imagery and visual
perception despite the fact that the mere processing of symbolic descrip-
tions should not be restricted in such a way1. Tacit knowledge specifically
includes the subconscious knowledge of what visual perception is like. It is
assumed that we use tacit knowledge to mimic, for example, reaction times
during mental imagery to fit those expected during visual perception of the
same stimulus (Pylyshyn, 1981). A crucial aspect of tacit knowledge is that
its application in mental imagery is not functional, that is, the simulation
that it is used for is not necessary to access or process the information of
the mental image. To make this point clearer, using tacit knowledge dur-
ing mental imagery is optional, yet, it is often induced by different demand
characteristics (Orne, 1962). The VS-LTM and its mappings could at first
glance be seen as an instance of tacit knowledge as it essentially contains
the same information that is assigned to tacit knowledge, i.e., the implicit
knowledge of how visual perception works. However, tacit knowledge con-
tains information what visual perception is like and the skills to simulate it,
whereas the VS-LTM contains the knowledge and skills of how to visually
perceive. That is, without the VS-LTM there is neither vision nor imagery.
Critically, this means that the VS-LTM is functional for mental imagery and
in that respect distinct from tacit knowledge.
4.3.3 The Enactive Theory
PIT is most similar to the enactive theory. Many of the assumptions of PIT
were adopted from the enactive theory. Given that the enactive theory has
only been described on a relatively coarse level compared to PIT, PIT could
be understood as a fleshed-out version of the enactive theory. This role is,
however, limited as some of the core commitments of the two theories are
incompatible. In the following, I will point out to which extent the two
theories are compatible and at which point they part in their assumptions.
Schemata and the VS-LTM
The employment of several different and specialized perceptual processes
both in (visual) perception and in (visuo-spatial) mental imagery is assumed
by the enactive theory and adopted by PIT. From this, it follows that ex-
planations for phenomena of mental imagery that generally show similar
behavioral properties as visual perception, e.g., mental scanning, are ex-
plained by both theories in principle in the same way. Furthermore, the
1For example, when shifting attention across a mental image, we reliably take more
time the longer the distance is that we shift across. In this sense the processing of the
mental image is restricted. Section 2.1.1 discusses mental scanning in detail.
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role of the VS-LTM in PIT can be treated as functionally equivalent to the
schemata of the enactive theory. Both schemata and the VS-LTM work in
a circular manner by activating and receiving input from several specialized
perceptual processes. The difference between them is, that the VS-LTM
maps what is perceived onto a set of mental concepts. Also the interpre-
tation of what is perceived in visual perception and what is “perceived” as
the mental image is represented by mental concepts (with respective per-
ceptual information). In contrast, the enactive theory explicitly states that
it assumes no such thing as an end product of visual perception and, in
fact, it assumes no explicit mental representations at all in the brain or
mind (Thomas, 1999, p. 218). Accordingly, the two theories further differ
as there are no corresponding components in the enactive theory to PIT’s
short-term memory, conceptual long-term memory, and mental concepts,
which can all be considered mental representations.
As the enactive theory assumes no explicit end products of visual per-
ception, it instead poses that all experience and knowledge is implicitly
stored through adjustments to the schemata themselves. That is, changes
to the dynamic processes of visual perception. PIT similarly assumes that
the mappings of the VS-LTM are being adjusted to implicitly store new
knowledge such as new or finer distinctions between mental concepts.
Open Issues in the Enactive Theory
Two open issues of the enactive theory are 1) the question how schemata can
be concretely imagined, and 2) how schemata can be embedded in a general
cognitive framework. PIT can be understood as a further development of
the enactive theory that addresses these two issues. However, the answers
offered by PIT are in contradiction to the core assumptions of the enactive
theory as elaborated above. Nevertheless, because of the overlap between
the two theories’ assumptions about (visual) perception and the “re-use” of
perceptual processes in mental imagery, a successful application of PIT to
phenomena of mental imagery should also be considered as (at least partly)
supporting the enactive theory.
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Chapter 5
The Computational Model
This chapter describes a computational implementation of the framework
of the perceptual instantiation theory (PIT). I describe the architecture of
the model and present two examples showing how the model works. For a
superficial understanding of the computational model it is sufficient to read
Section 5.2 describing these two examples. Lastly, some general aspects
about implementations of the framework of PIT are discussed.
5.1 The Architecture of the Model
In the following sections I first discuss the different components of the model
and what representations they include. Afterwards, a list of all the data
types used in the model is given. Lastly, I describe how the functions are
implemented in the model.
5.1.1 The Components and Representations of the Model
As outlined in the formal framework of PIT, the computational model com-
prises the four components: 1) C-LTM, 2) STM, 3) VS-LTM, and 4) the
visual/motor system.
The C-LTM holds the set of all mental concepts. This set is represented
in a directed graph. The nodes of the graph correspond to scenes, objects,
and properties of objects while the edges correspond to spatial relations.
This graph holds not only different remembered scenes but also the general
background knowledge. Figure 5.1 depicts a subgraph of the graph in C-
LTM.
The STM holds a set of mental concepts and a corresponding set of per-
ceptual information. The mental concepts are represented in the same way
as in C-LTM, i.e., as a directed graph. Perceptual information that is made
available via instantiation extends the respective mental concepts. The per-
ceptual information is subject to decay. This decay is implemented by the
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Figure 5.1: A subgraph of the graph of all mental concepts in C-LTM. The
depicted subgraph shows parts of the conceptual description of the also de-
picted scene S1. The nodes represent scenes and objects and further include
properties of objects. The edges represent the spatial relations between ob-
jects and parts of objects. The same graph structure is also used in STM
where the edges (spatial relations) and nodes (objects) are extended with
instances of perceptual information.
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removal of perceptual information after a set time interval. Decayed per-
ceptual information will have to be re-instantiated if needed. Furthermore,
there is an upper bound to the number of mental concepts that can be held
in STM. If this bound is exceeded by retrieving or inferring further mental
concepts, previously retrieved mental concepts are removed. This removal
first affects those mental concepts that have not been used recently.
The VS-LTM holds the procedural knowledge of what perceptual actions
to employ and how to identify mental concepts based on perceptual infor-
mation. The representations in VS-LTM that are used by the two functions
identify and select to realize this procedural knowledge are: a normalized
vector for each direction, a scaling factor for each distance and each size,
and a set of normalized vectors for each object. How these representations
are used by the two functions is elaborated in Section 5.1.3.
The implementation of the visual/motor system comprises one variable,
one constant, and the function execute. The variable represents the current
focus of attention and is implemented as a coordinate with an initial value of
(0,0). It is referred to as focus. The constant is a fixed value representing the
distance from the current focus within which attention shifts are executed
covertly. This value is referred to as radius.
5.1.2 The Data Types Used in the Model
In the following, a complete list of all data types used in the model is given.
The extended Backus-Naur-Form syntax is used1.
scene := id, objectn, spatial relation[(n−1)...n(n−1)]
object := id, [size], [partn], [coordinate], [imagined size],
[shape information], instantiated
part := object, relative size, spatial relation
imagined size := size
size := large size | medium size | small size
spatial relation := direction, [distance], [topology]
direction := left | right | top | bottom | top left | top right |
bottom left | bottom right | center
topology := inside outside
distance := far distance | medium distance | close distance
shape information := linen, extent2
line := coordinate2
location := coordinate
attention shift := id, vectorn
focus := coordinate
coordinate := x, y
1http://standards.iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/s026153 ISO IEC 14977 1996(E).zip;
raised numbers indicate repetitions, e.g., A := Bx indicates that A comprises x elements
of B.
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vector := x, y
relative size := -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2
id ∈ S (the set of strings)
x, y, extent, radius ∈ R (the set of real numbers)
inside outside, instantiated ∈ B (the set of boolean values)
far distance := 4
medium distance := 2
close distance := 1
large size := 4
medium size := 2
small size :=1
left := 1
right := 2
top := 3
bottom := 4
top left := 5
top right := 6
bottom left := 7
bottom right := 8
center := 9
Perceptual Information, Perceptual Actions, And Mental Con-
cepts
Perceptual information is implemented by the following data types of the
above list: shape information, location, and vectors (as instances of spatial
relations).
The model generalizes perceptual actions to attention shifts which are
implemented by vectors.
Mental concepts correspond to all the qualitative data types that are
used to describe scenes or objects in the model; that is, scenes, objects,
the sizes of objects, and spatial relations, i.e., directions, orientations, and
topology.
5.1.3 The Functions of the Model
The Function Retrieve
The function retrieve provides a set of mental concepts matching a to-be-
imagined scene from C-LTM to STM. Each remembered scene corresponds
to a node in the graph of the C-LTM. This is the scene-node. The nodes di-
rectly linked to from that scene-node correspond to the objects in the scene.
These are retrieved together with the spatial relations of the scene (which
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are the edges from the scene-node to the object-nodes). These initially re-
trieved mental concepts do not fully describe the scene, because the parts
of the objects are not retrieved. The parts of the objects are the nodes that
the object-nodes link to. If these details are required for a mental imagery
task, they will be retrieved with an additional call of the retrieve function
asking for the respective object-node. This way further and further details
of the to-be-imagined scene, i.e., parts of parts of parts, are retrieved on
demand.
The Function Interpret
The function interpret selects a subset of mental concepts and perceptual
information from the set of mental concepts and perceptual information in
STM. This selection represents the mental image. The function interpret is
implemented in a trivial way. Section 5.3.2 will discuss why a plausible and
non-trivial implementation of this function is an unsolved and hard problem
in itself and thus outside the scope of this thesis.
The function interpret is implemented so that those mental concepts
which are retrieved from C-LTM as the conceptual description of the mental
image will always be part of the interpretation together with the perceptual
information that is made available via the instantiation of those mental con-
cepts. It is possible that perceptual information leads to the identification of
other mental concepts that are not part of the initial conceptual description
(see the function identify described later in this section), but these mental
concepts will not be part of the final interpretation.
Functions of the User Interface
The computational model can run different simulations of the generation of
mental images and the inference of information from mental images. These
functions are implemented as part of the STM component and are listed in
the following:
• Visual imagination of a scene: instantiation of the shapes of the
objects and the spatial relations of the given scene. This does not
include the instantiation of the parts of the objects.
• Spatial imagination of a scene: instantiation of the spatial rela-
tions and assignment of locations to the objects of the given scene.
The shape information of the objects is not instantiated; the objects
are abstracted to points.
• Elaboration of an object: instantiation of the parts of the given
object and of the spatial relations between the parts and the object.
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• Detailed imagination of a scene: equals the visual imagination of
the scene with a subsequent elaboration of each object in that scene.
• Inferring spatial relations between two objects: the location
and optionally further instantiated perceptual information (e.g., shape
information) are used to identify a spatial relation.
• Identification of objects based on an instance of shape in-
formation: the instantiated shape information is identified, i.e., it is
mapped onto a set of mental concepts that (fully or partially) fit with
the shape information.
The Function Select
The function select realizes the procedural knowledge of the VS-LTM which
maps mental concepts onto sets of perceptual actions. This function is
context-sensitive so that already available perceptual information is taken
into account when mapping mental concepts onto perceptual actions. In
the following, it is distinguished between the selection of perceptual actions
for mental concepts describing spatial relations and for mental concepts
describing shapes.
Mapping Spatial Relations Onto Attention Shifts Spatial relations
comprise of a direction and optionally a distance and topological informa-
tion. The implemented directions are top-left, top, top-right, right, bottom-
right, bottom, bottom-left, left, center). Center represents the lack of a
direction and is used to describe how parts relate to their father-object. For
example, to describe the relative location of the nose in a face: the nose is
located in the middle of the face, i.e., in the center. Directions are imple-
mented by normalized vectors, e.g., the prototypical left of is implemented
by (-1,0). Distance is represented by three mental concepts close, medium,
and far which are used as the factors 1, 2, and 3. These factors scale the
normalized vectors that represent the direction. Topological information
is restricted to the distinction of whether a part is inside or outside of its
father-object.
The following describes how a given spatial relation is mapped onto an
attention shift, i.e., a vector. Three cases are distinguished; each new case
is an extension of the former: 1) only direction and distance are provided,
2) additionally shape information of the reference object is provided, 3)
additionally topological information is provided.
Case 1: a spatial relation describing direction and distance.
The normalized vector corresponding to the given direction is multiplied
with the factor for the given distance. If no distance is provided the default
distance of close is used.
82
Case 2: a spatial relation within context. Same as case 1 but
the vector is multiplied with the extent of the shape along the respective
axis, e.g., for left-of the horizontal extent is used. Additionally the extent
is multiplied with a scaling factor with the default value of 12. The results
of the above calculations are depicted in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: The mapping of spatial relations between objects onto attention
shifts. The figure depicts how the selection of attention shifts for spatial
relations depends on the distance and the extent of the imagined shape of
the reference object. How the resulting vectors are computed is explained
in Section 5.1.3.
Case 3: a spatial relation between a part and its father-object.
This case is restricted to mental concepts describing a spatial relation be-
tween a part and its father-object. If the part is inside the object, the
normalized direction vector is multiplied by the factor for the provided dis-
tance divided by 6 and multiplied by the respective extent of the shape of
the father-object. If the part is outside the object, the vector is calculated as
in the inside-case and then added to the shape’s extent (along the direction
of the spatial relation) multiplied by a scaling factor that is set to 0.5 by
default3. Figure 5.3 depicts the results of these calculations.
Mapping Shapes Onto Attention Shifts The attention shifts associ-
ated with a shape are so that the vectors implementing the attention shifts
describe the respective shape as a polygon. For example, the set of attention
2The purpose of this factor is to allow adjustments to how much the imagined shape
of the reference object influences the selection of an attention shift for spatial relations.
3As above, this factor serves the purpose of adjustment.
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Figure 5.3: The mapping of spatial relations between objects and their parts
onto attention shifts. The figure depicts how the selection of attention shifts
for a spatial relation that describes the location of a part relative to its
father-object depends on distance, topology, and the extent of the imagined
shape of the reference object. How the resulting vectors are computed is
explained in Section 5.1.3.
shifts for square would be vectors that describe the four orthogonal edges
that form a square. The actual perceptual actions that the human visual
system uses to perceive different shapes are not fully known and thus this
simplification is used for practical purposes.
The vectors are normalized so that the recognition of shapes is size-
invariant. By using an appropriate scaling factor the vectors can be matched
to a shape of different sizes. Three different sizes in which shapes can be
imagined are distinguished in the model: small, medium, and large. The
sizes are implemented as factors: 1, 2, and 3. In order to retrieve a set of
vectors corresponding to the shape of an object, the object and optionally
the to-be-imagined size are provided to the function select. If a size is
provided, its respective factor is multiplied with each of the vectors. If no
size is provided, the default size of small is used. The resulting vectors are
provided to the function execute of the visual/motor system.
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The Function Identify
The function identify realizes the procedural knowledge of the VS-LTM
which maps perceptual information onto mental concepts. This way spa-
tial relations and shapes are identified based on the perceptual information
made available by executing perceptual actions. The following discusses this
function for spatial relations and shapes separately.
Mapping Perceptual Information Onto Spatial Relations An at-
tention shift, for example, made between the locations of entities in a mental
image, yields perceptual information in the form of a vector. The mapping
of that vector onto a fitting spatial relation is done as follows. First, that
direction vector that is closest to the given vector is identified. This is re-
alized by comparing the angle between each direction vector and the given
vector. The direction vector closest in angle is chosen and determines the
direction of the returned spatial relation. If additional information, such as
the extent of the reference object or the fact that the to-be-inferred spa-
tial relation holds between a part and its father-object, is available, it is
used for the calculation of the distance of the spatial relation. For this, the
given vector is projected onto the already identified direction vector and af-
terwards the calculations as already described above for the function select
are simply reversed. The resulting distance is then projected onto one of the
three mental concepts of distances (small, medium, large) based on which
it is closest to. The resulting spatial relation containing direction, distance,
and optionally topology is returned.
Mapping Perceptual Information Onto Shapes The mapping of per-
ceptual information of a shape onto a fitting set of mental concepts is done
as follows. The perceptual information of a shape is represented by a set of
line segments, i.e., pairs of coordinates. These pairs of coordinates are trans-
formed to vectors by simply subtracting the coordinates of each pair. The
resulting vectors now correspond to the representation of attention shifts
which the mental concepts describing shapes are linked to. The given vec-
tors are compared to these sets of attention shifts to find a full or partial
match. The mental concepts representing objects whose shape is a full or
partial match are returned together with the sizes of the matching shapes.
Full match: A full match is found when the given vectors correspond
to a set of vectors in VS-LTM with some constant scaling factor that is
applied to all vectors. This scaling factor is then projected onto one of the
mental concepts of size based on which it is closest to. The mental concepts
of shape and size are returned.
Partial match: A partial match is found when the given vectors
correspond to a subset of a set of vectors in VS-LTM. A constant scaling
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factor is again projected onto one of the sizes. The mental concepts of shape
and size are returned.
There can be several matches so that one set of vectors correspond to
several shapes at once. For a trivial example, consider a square, which is
simultaneously a square, a rectangle, a parallelogram, and a schematized
“U”, i.e., “unionsq”. The “unionsq” is an example for a partial match.
The Function Execute
The function execute takes as input a set of perceptual actions. The model
distinguishes between attention shifts that instantiate a spatial relation and
those that instantiate shape information. Spatial relations are instantiated
by a single attention shift while shape information is instantiated by a set
of more than one attention shift. The set of attention shifts which are the
input to the function execute are either provided by the VS-LTM, i.e., the
function select selects a set of attention shifts for a mental concept, or atten-
tion shifts are derived from the already instantiated perceptual information
when inferring new information from a mental image. In the following, these
different cases are discussed separately.
Instantiating a spatial relation: An attention shift is retrieved
from the function select of the VS-LTM. The attention shift is executed
by simply adding the vector (which represent the attention shift) to the
coordinate of the current focus. The resulting perceptual information is the
new coordinate of focus and the relative change of focus. This perceptual
information constitutes a location (the new focus) and a spatial relation (the
change of focus).
Instantiating a shape: A set of attention shifts is retrieved from
the function select of the VS-LTM. These attention shifts are executed by
successively adding the vectors to the coordinates of focus. The percep-
tual information that results are line segments derived from the different
coordinates that focus was changed to, the location, and the extent of the
imagined shape (which is derived from the set of line segments). This per-
ceptual information constitutes an instance of a shape.
Inferring new information: The difference between the above cases
and the case of inference is that the input for the inference is not provided
by the VS-LTM but directly from the perceptual information that is already
available in STM. For inference no mental concept needs to be mapped onto
attention shifts, but perceptual information such as two already instanti-
ated locations are used to directly execute an attention shift between them.
By subtracting the coordinates of two locations a vector representing an at-
tention shift results. This attention shift is executed and yields perceptual
information, i.e., the change of the coordinate of focus. This perceptual
information is used by the function identify of the VS-LTM and mapped
onto a set of mental concepts. For the case of a single attention shift be-
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tween two locations, the identified mental concepts will be spatial relations
containing direction, distance, and topology.
Similarly, instead of inferring a spatial relation, this process can be based
on already instantiated shape information, i.e., a set of line segments repre-
sented as a set of pairs of coordinates. Pairs of coordinates are transformed
to vectors by subtraction. These vectors can be executed as attention shifts
and the resulting perceptual information can be identified as a different type
of shape.
Time of execution: The time of executing perceptual actions is
implemented to be linear to the length of the vectors that represent the
perceptual actions. This approximates the time constraints of the human
visual/motor system as discussed in Section 3.2.4.
Overt vs covert attention shifts: Attention shifts will be executed
overtly if their respective vector would shift the focus beyond the distance
given by the radius. Otherwise it will be executed covertly. This behavior
is in analogy to our ability to shift attention within the periphery of our
gaze during a fixation in visual perception.
5.2 Examples
The following two examples serve the purpose of giving an easy and slightly
simplified overview of how the model realizes mental imagery. In order to
fully understand how the model works it is recommended to read Section 5.1.
However, for a superficial understanding of the model the following two
examples are sufficient.
5.2.1 Generating a Mental Image
Figure 5.4 depicts how the model generates a mental image of a scene from
memory. After the task has been given, the conceptual description of the
to-be-imagined scene is retrieved from C-LTM. The C-LTM contains scenes
which each consist of a set of objects and a set of spatial relations. As shown
in the figure, an object can further have properties, e.g., qualitative size, and
link to other objects.
In the depicted case, the STM retrieves a scene consisting of two objects
and one spatial relation. The object triangle has the property small. The
mental concepts triangle and small are instantiated with a set of percep-
tual information. The first step is the selection of perceptual actions that
correspond to the perception of a small triangle. This step is realized by
the function select of the visuo-spatial long-term memory (VS-LTM). Tri-
angle is mapped onto a set of vectors that represent attention shifts. The
vectors are adjusted with the factor α1 which represents the property small.
The resulting vectors are used by the function execute of the visual/motor
system. The model realizes the execution of attention shifts by successive
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addition of the vectors to a coordinate (which represents the focus of at-
tention). The function execute makes a set of line segments (i.e., pairs
of coordinates) available. These represent the perceptual information that
forms an instance of the shape of small triangle. From this shape informa-
tion further perceptual information is derived such as the location and the
extent of the imagined shape.
As a next step, the spatial relation left of is instantiated. For this
step, the already available perceptual information of the small triangle is
considered so that the concrete instantiation of left of is realized within this
context. Concretely, the imagined extent of triangle is taken into account
by the function select of the VS-LTM when it selects one of many attention
shifts that correspond to the perception of left of. In the depicted case,
the attention shift is determined by a prototypical attention shift and the
horizontal extent of triangle as well as a scaling factor β1. The attention shift
is executed by the visual/motor system and yields as perceptual information
a location of square and an instance of left of.
The next step, which is not depicted in the figure anymore, would be the
instantiation of the shape of square.
5.2.2 Inferring Information in a Mental Image
Figure 5.5 depicts how the model simulates the task of inferring information
from a mental image. The model was given the two premises “A left of B”
and “C right of B”. These two premises have already been imagined so that
the locations of the three objects A, B, and C are instantiated. The objects
do not contain a conceptual description of their shape and accordingly no
shape information was instantiated; instead the objects are abstracted to
points which equal their location. The model is then queried for the spatial
relation between A and C. This spatial relation was not given and is therefore
inferred from the already available perceptual information, i.e., in this case
the locations of A and C. An attention shift is executed by the visual/motor
system based on the two available locations. This attention shift yields
perceptual information which is identified by the VS-LTM. That is, the
function identify maps it onto a set of mental concepts, in this case the
spatial relation consisting of the two mental concepts left of and far. These
inferred mental concepts are used to answer the question.
5.3 Notes on Implementations of PIT
5.3.1 Modeling Approaches
This chapter has presented one possible implementation of PIT. However,
the framework of PIT can be implemented using a wide range of different
modeling approaches as well as combinations of such approaches.
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For example, qualitative spatial calculi (e.g., Wallgru¨n, Frommberger,
Wolter, Dylla, & Freksa, 2007; Freksa, 1991) could plausibly be used to
model the different types of mental concepts and their representation in
more detail. The calculi of qualitative spatial reasoning aim to imitate
the qualitative representations used by humans by employing qualitative
descriptions of spatial situations including direction, orientation, topology,
and mereology.
Furthermore, probabilistic approaches such as bayesian modeling could
plausibly be used to model, for example, the background knowledge used by
the VS-LTM. That is, modeling the acquired information of how likely it is
to perceive one mental concept compared to another in a given situation.
Such statistical information would also allow to determine which perceptual
action will maximize information gain.
5.3.2 Problematic Aspects
There are two problematic aspects to consider when implementing PIT.
These are discussed in the following.
Visual Perception
Research on visual perception is limited in its knowledge about what low-
level actions the human organism employs during visual perception, how
theses actions are concretely realized, and what purposes they serve ex-
actly. Similarly, it is an open question what exactly the low-level perceptual
features are that the human visual system can process and how exactly
it processes such features. For any computational implementation of the
framework of PIT, it is thus necessary to make several assumptions and
simplifications with respect to the perceptual information, perceptual ac-
tions, and mental concepts used for visual perception and mental imagery.
Background Knowledge
It is without doubt that human cognition and major aspects of human cog-
nition such as (visual) perception and mental imagery can only be under-
stood with respect to both the current context that an organism is in and
the history of that organism (i.e., the acquired procedural and conceptual
knowledge). This means, that any model of mental imagery has to either
be able to acquire such background knowledge from autonomous interaction
with the environment or this knowledge has to be modeled and put into the
model by the designer. The latter option practically means that the back-
ground knowledge will be highly simplified. The option of letting a model
of human cognition learn such knowledge autonomously in a non-trivial en-
vironment poses a hard problem in itself.
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In particular, the function interpret of the framework of PIT strongly
depends on such background knowledge. The interpretation of ambiguous
perceptual information corresponds to the problem of categorical perception.
Categorial perception, i.e., the ability to see and recognize entities as what
they are, is considered an AI-complete problem in the strong-AI community
(Shapiro, 1992). This means that the difficulty of this problem is considered
equivalent to that of achieving strong AI.
An approach to investigate these issues in a simple artificial domain is
discussed in Section 7.2.1.
5.4 Summary
This chapter has presented a computational implementation of PIT. This
implementation together with the framework of Chapter 4 serve the pur-
pose of making the concepts and ideas described in Chapter 3 more clear.
The computational model also serves as a proof-of-concept showing that
PIT is sufficiently complete and consistent as a theory so that implemented
instances of it are possible. Lastly, the computational model can run simula-
tions of mental imagery tasks which offer concrete mechanistic explanations
of phenomena as well as specific predictions. In Chapter 6 both the the-
ory and the computational model will be applied to show how PIT can
account for the different phenomena of mental imagery that were previously
presented in Chapter 2.
90
F
ig
u
re
5.
4
:
G
en
er
a
ti
o
n
o
f
a
m
en
ta
l
im
a
g
e.
T
h
e
fi
g
u
re
d
ep
ic
ts
h
ow
th
e
m
o
d
el
si
m
u
la
te
s
th
e
ge
n
er
a
ti
o
n
o
f
a
m
en
ta
l
im
a
g
e
o
f
a
sc
en
e.
T
h
e
to
-b
e-
im
a
g
in
ed
sc
en
e
is
sh
ow
n
in
th
e
u
p
p
er
ri
g
h
t
co
rn
er
of
th
e
fi
g
u
re
.
T
h
e
w
o
rk
fl
ow
fo
ll
ow
s
th
e
a
rr
ow
s
fr
o
m
le
ft
to
ri
g
h
t.
D
et
a
il
s
a
re
gi
ve
n
in
th
e
te
x
t.
91
F
ig
u
re
5.
5
:
In
fe
re
n
ce
in
a
m
en
ta
l
im
a
g
e.
T
h
e
fi
g
u
re
d
ep
ic
ts
h
ow
th
e
m
o
d
el
si
m
u
la
te
s
th
e
in
fe
re
n
ce
o
f
n
ew
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
fr
o
m
a
m
en
ta
l
im
a
g
e.
T
h
e
w
or
k
fl
ow
fo
ll
ow
s
th
e
a
rr
ow
s
fr
o
m
le
ft
to
ri
g
h
t.
D
et
a
il
s
a
re
gi
ve
n
in
th
e
te
x
t.
92
Chapter 6
Evaluation
This chapter presents the evaluation of the perceptual instantiation theory
(PIT) and its computational model. The previously identified and discussed
empirical phenomena of Chapter 2 are picked up in this chapter and the
respective explanations and predictions of PIT are elaborated. The phe-
nomena of mental scanning and eye movements are explained with support
of simulations of the computational model while the explanations for mental
reinterpretation and unilateral neglect are based on the theoretical descrip-
tion of PIT.
6.1 Mental Scanning
The relevant empirical findings on mental scanning can be summarized as
follows: 1) there is a robust mental scanning effect and 2) the specific pa-
rameters of that effect, specifically the slope of the linear relation between
reaction time and distance, are significantly affected by a number of different
factors. I will first discuss the general mental scanning effect and then how
it can be influenced.
6.1.1 The General Mental Scanning Effect
The mental scanning effect is the finding that humans show an approxi-
mately linear relationship between the time of shifting their attention from
one point to another in a mental image and the distance between these
two points. The compared distance is the distance in the original stimulus,
because distance in a mental image cannot itself be measured. PIT and
its model explain this effect with what I will term the equivalence ex-
planation1. PIT poses that mental imagery employs the same perceptual
processes used during visual perception. Therefore, similar reaction time
1The enactive theory uses the same equivalence explanation to explain the general
mental scanning effect (see Section 2.3.1).
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Figure 6.1: Two stimuli depicting islands as used in mental scanning exper-
iments. The island on the right additionally contains sign posts indicating
inconsistent distances (Richman et al., 1979). Compare Figure 2.7.
patterns as observed during visual perception will also be observed during
visuo-spatial mental imagery. During visual perception a shift in attention -
whether it is realized as, for example, a saccade or a head movement - shows
the property that shifting over a longer distance generally takes longer than
shifting over a shorter distance. This property results simply from the phys-
ical structure of the human body, e.g., one’s gaze cannot go from A to B
without going through the intermediate space (also see Section 3.2.4 for a
discussion on this constraint for perception and imagery). Therefore, PIT
explains the general mental scanning effect trivially due to the common
employment of the same perceptual processes as in visual perception.
The model of PIT reflects this explanation in more detail. A remembered
stimulus is encoded in a scene which consists of the conceptual description
of the objects and the spatial relations between them. The spatial relations
of the scene reflect the remembered distances. For the generation and pro-
cessing of the mental image of that scene, the respective mental concepts are
instantiated with perceptual information. For this instantiation the mental
concepts describing, for example, the spatial relation left-of and close are
mapped onto a fitting attention shift implemented in the model as a vector.
The length of the vector corresponds to the distance qualitatively described
by the spatial relation. The time for executing an attention shift is linear to
the length of the vector that represents that attention shift. It follows that a
spatial relation describing a longer distance will be instantiated using an at-
tention shift over a longer distance. And that the execution of that attention
shift will take proportionally longer the longer the conceptually described
distance is. Table 6.1 shows the model’s output for a mental scanning task
using the left stimulus of Figure 6.1.
6.1.2 Variations of Mental Scanning
There are several different variations of the mental scanning paradigm which
all show the general mental scanning effect. Yet, many variations signifi-
cantly affect the slope of the linear relation between distance and time. That
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Table 6.1: The model’s reaction times (RT) are averaged over 10 trials and
include noise. Correlation: r = 0.94
Scan path RT Model Actual Relative Distance
house → tree 29.61 4.47
house → well 31.85 4.47
house → lake 12.14 2
lake → tree 27.67 4
lake → well 42.34 5.67
tree → well 35.49 4
Table 6.2: Mental scanning (Richman et al., 1979). Reaction times (RT) of
the model are averages over ten trials and include noise.
Condition RT Experiment [s] RT Model
20 route 3.118 25.36
80 route 3.496 35.03
is, the speed of mental scanning is affected. I will only focus on one of those
variations here, because the explanation that PIT gives for this specific case
similarly applies to all other variations as well. The right side of Figure 6.1
shows a stimulus similar to the one used by Richman et al. (1979) for their
mental scanning experiment. In contrast to the original mental scanning
paradigm, the stimulus additionally contains two sign posts indicating cer-
tain distances between entities. These distances are obviously inconsistent
with the actual distances in the stimulus. Specifically, the distance between
the hut and the tree is of the same length as that between the hut and the
well. The sign posts, however, indicate that the distance between the hut
and the tree is much longer, i.e., 80 miles, than the distance between the hut
and the well, i.e., 20 miles. Participants were asked to mentally scan several
routes using their mental image of the stimulus. A reliable effect of the sign
posts on the reaction times of scanning was found so that participants took
longer to scan along the “80 miles” route than along the “20 miles” route.
This experiment is an example of how cognitive penetration affects mental
imagery. That is, the reaction times of the mental scanning task were signif-
icantly affected by additional knowledge or belief of the participant; in this
case the suggested, albeit incorrect, distances. Other variations of mental
scanning can be seen as similar, as they also vary the participants’s belief or
knowledge. For example, participants are made belief that mentally scan-
ning over certain distances takes a certain time (Goldston et al., 1985) or
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more indirectly, the experimenters are made belief that certain mental scan-
ning outcomes are to be expected (Intons-Peterson, 1983). In both these
cases the induced belief affects the general mental scanning effect in the
expected way.
PIT’s explanation for the experiment of Richman et al. (1979) is based
on the theory’s assumption that the mental concepts underlying mental im-
agery are the result of the integration of multi-modal input. That is, they
combine the sensory input of several senses including rather subtle infor-
mation such as the suggested distances in the stimulus or different demand
characteristics. For this reason, the conceptual description of the stimulus
does not only reflect the metrical properties of the stimulus but also inte-
grates the semantics of the sign posts suggesting different distances. That
is, the spatial relation between, for example, the hut and the tree is not just
top-left-of as it might be for the same mental scanning stimulus without sign
posts, but rather top-left-of, far with far corresponding to the suggested “80
miles” distance. As elaborated above for the general mental scanning effect,
such changes in the conceptual description lead to respective changes in re-
action time. In this case the scanning time increases for the “80 miles” route
and decreases for the “20 miles” route. Table 6.2 shows the resulting reac-
tion times of the model for a simulation of the mental scanning variation of
Richman et al. (1979).
6.1.3 Predictions
PIT makes two clear and testable predictions with respect to mental scan-
ning. The first prediction results from the equivalence explanation for
mental scanning posed by both the enactive theory and PIT. This prediction
has, however, not been mentioned by Thomas (1999) or in other publica-
tions on the enactive theory. The second prediction results from the fact
that the mental concepts of PIT are the result of the integration of different
inputs. These two predictions are discussed in the following.
Both the enactive theory and PIT assume that (visual) perception com-
prises of perceptual actions which are also employed during mental imagery.
The linear relation between distance and time in mental scanning is ex-
plained by the fact that shifting attention in perception also has this prop-
erty. Actually, shifting attention using, for example, saccades does not show
a strictly linear relationship between the time and the to-be-shifted-over
distances. This is because other effects such as saccades reaching a higher
acceleration and velocity over longer distances and, additionally, varying cor-
rective movements for “overshooting” of saccadic eye movements also play a
role. The prediction, made by both the enactive theory and PIT, is that the
observed relationship between time and distance in mental scanning should
upon closer observation show a stronger correlation to the (non-linear) one
of attention shifts as employed in visual perception rather than to a strictly
96
linear one.
The second prediction that follows from PIT’s explanation of the vari-
ations of mental scanning is that the scanning time is determined not only
by the properties of the stimulus but, furthermore, by any other sort of
related and even conflicting information obtained through other modalities.
That is, if additional information is systematically varied in both content
and mode of communication, PIT predicts that the scanning time will be af-
fected according to that additional information. PIT poses that the mental
concepts on which mental images are based are multi-modal and integrative
so that they combine related input and subsequently the outcome of the
instantiation of these mental concepts will change. It should be expected
that conflict resolution, i.e., the process of mapping conflicting spatial re-
lations onto one set of perceptual actions during mental imagery, requires
additional time.
A prediction about eye movements during mental scanning is described
in Section 6.3.4 which discusses predictions of PIT with respect to eye move-
ments during mental imagery.
6.2 Mental Reinterpretation
The empirical findings on mental reinterpretation that were identified in
Chapter 2 can be summarized as follows. First, the literature reports that
there are two classes of stimuli that differ in their difficulty of mental reinter-
pretation. On the one hand, ambiguous drawings like the duck-rabbit have
been shown to be very hard to mentally reinterpret while, on the other hand,
simpler stimuli based on elementary geometrical shapes including alphanu-
meric characters have been shown to be comparatively easy to mentally
reinterpret. The second major finding is that there are several factors that
significantly improve performance in the mental reinterpretation of stimuli
that are otherwise hard to mentally reinterpret.
6.2.1 Differences Between Stimuli of Mental Reinterpreta-
tion
I will first elaborate why stimuli like the duck-rabbit are very hard to men-
tally reinterpret as a mental image and then apply this explanation to the
finding that other types of stimuli are easier to mentally reinterpret.
Stimuli That are Difficult to Mentally Reinterpret
Mental reinterpretation generally poses the question why the same ambigu-
ous stimuli are very easy to reinterpret in visual perception while they are
hard to mentally reinterpret using mental images. I will use the duck-rabbit
as a representative example for those stimuli whose mental reinterpretation
97
has been shown to be hard. The duck-rabbit (depicted in Figure 6.2) has
been used in almost all considered studies on mental reinterpretation and
is, furthermore, very similar to other stimuli such as the goose-hawk or the
chef-dog (see Section 2.1.2 for an overview of different ambiguous stimuli).
The hardness of mental reinterpretation strongly indicates that there must
be a critical difference between visual perception and mental imagery with
respect to (re-)interpretation. Section 3.2.6 outlined differences between vi-
sual perception and mental imagery based on the assumptions of PIT. PIT
poses that the key difference with respect to mental reinterpretation is the
fact that in visual perception we are able to draw an interpretation basically
“from scratch”, i.e., with little bias towards a (previous) interpretation. In
mental imagery, in contrast, the process of reinterpreting an imagined stim-
ulus requires a mental image of that stimulus. That is, before a mental
image is inspected, it needs to be generated. The representation of a men-
tal image, however, corresponds to an interpretation drawn from the set of
all mental concepts and their instantiation of perceptual information (see
Section 3.2.6). This interpretation will include the mental concepts of the
conceptual description retrieved from conceptual long-term memory. The
reason these mental concepts are included in the initial interpretation is
simply that they are the conceptual description of what is to be imagined.
To put it simply, generating a mental image of the duck-rabbit stimulus that
was recognized as a duck, will lead to a mental image with the interpreta-
tion “duck” and the respective mental concepts describing the parts of a
duck. That is, before the mental image could be potentially reinterpreted
as “rabbit”, it is necessarily imagined as “duck”.
In order to find an alternative interpretation, a set of mental concepts
has to be identified from the perceptual information so that these mental
concepts could form a coherent alternative interpretation. However, in men-
tal imagery, the perceptual information is not taken from the (ambiguous)
real-life stimulus but it is generated as instances of those mental concepts
which have been retrieved from conceptual long-term memory. Therefore,
the perceptual information available “fits” the initial interpretation. Be-
cause mental images are based on abstracted mental concepts, the gener-
ated perceptual information will not exactly resemble that of the original
stimulus but will rather be prototypical for the given mental concepts. This
point is supported by an experiment reported in (Chambers & Reisberg,
1992). They briefly showed participants the duck-rabbit so that only one
interpretation of it was recognized. Participants then compared their men-
tal image to pictures of slightly modified duck-rabbits. The modifications
were made to parts of the duck-rabbit which are only relevant for one of the
two interpretations, e.g., removal of the mouth of the rabbit and changes to
the beak of the duck. Participants were less likely to notice changes to the
original stimulus that are irrelevant to their interpretation and more likely
to notice changes relevant to their interpretation. These results support the
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assumption that a mental image is formed specific to one’s initial interpre-
tation and might even lack some of the details of the original stimulus that
would allow a successful mental reinterpretation.
Summarizing, in mental imagery, a mental (re-)interpretation has a
strong bias towards the initial interpretation of the mental image. This bias
has two reasons. The first reason is the fact that there already is an initial
interpretation which would have to be “overwritten” by an alternative inter-
pretation. And the second reason is that the perceptual information from
which (alternative) mental concepts can be identified has been generated to
specifically fit the mental concepts of the initial representation.
This bias can explain why mental reinterpretation is generally hard. It
is worth repeating that mental reinterpretation without any sort of hints
and with visually presented stimuli has been shown to be very hard. For
example, no participant managed to find the second interpretation of either
the duck-rabbit, the Necker cube, or the Schro¨der staircase (all are de-
picted in Figure 6.2) in the original experiments of Chambers and Reisberg
(1985). Slezak (1995) reports similar results for a variety of different am-
biguous stimuli, e.g., requiring rotation, figure/ground reversal, the Kanizsa
Illusion2, which almost none of the participants could mentally reinterpret.
Additionally, Reisberg and Chambers (1991) report a series of experiments
using different types of ambiguous stimuli that again were not successfully
reinterpreted by almost all participants except when hints were given.
Stimuli That are Easy to Mentally Reinterpret
But there are also stimuli for which successful mental reinterpretation even
without hints has been reported. Slezak (1995) used “mirrored number”
stimuli and Finke et al. (1989) used a variety of stimuli made up of simple
geometric shapes and alphanumeric characters. Examples of both of these
stimuli are depicted in Figure 2.3 of Chapter 2. For these types of stimuli
often a majority of participants was able to successfully reinterpret them
mentally. As discussed for the difficult stimuli, in PIT a mental image always
has an initial interpretation. Therefore, in order to mentally reinterpret
a mental image this initial interpretation has to be replaced with a new
interpretation. That is, the new interpretation will have to provide a more
plausible description of the stimulus than the initial interpretation does. I
will now discuss to which extent this explanation is consistent with these
reinterpretable stimuli.
Observing the stimuli in Figure 2.3, it can be plausibly claimed that these
stimuli either do not really represent anything meaningful beyond their very
shapes or they do so in a highly schematized way. For example, the “mir-
rored 2” could at best be described as a “heart on a plate”; an image that
2These stimuli require the combination of the contours of parts of the image to form a
new emerging shape.
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Figure 6.2: The duck-rabbit, the Necker cube and the Schroeder staircase.
The duck-rabbit can be both seen as a duck or a rabbit. The Necker cube
and the Schroeder staircase are ambiguous with respect to which part is
interpreted to be in front and which part to be in the back. For the Necker
cube either the lower left side or the upper right side of the cube can be seen
as being in the front. The Schroeder staircase can be interpreted so that the
lower left part or the upper right part is extending towards the observer.
seems rather odd and unfamiliar. The point to make here is that these stim-
uli, in contrast to even a simple drawing like the duck-rabbit, seem much
less realistic and meaningful, or simply less plausible to depict something
familiar. There are studies which support this point that concrete “mean-
ing” of stimuli plays a critical role in mental reinterpretation: Brandimonte,
Hitch, and Bishop (1992a, 1992b) have shown that figures that are easy to
name are more difficult to mentally reinterpret than figures that are difficult
to name.
Another difference that can be assumed between these stimuli and the
duck-rabbit is that the latter is much more likely to be conceptually repre-
sented as a composition of parts (in this case natural to an animal) such as
ears, head, eyes, and nose with the respective spatial relations between them.
Whereas, the “heart on a plate” offers perhaps two parts and alphanumeric
characters or simple geometric shapes might be represented holistically as
consisting of just a single part3. The same observation applies also to the
to-be-discovered second meaning of those stimuli. The new interpretations
would similarly be conceptually represented by rather few mental concepts.
For the mirrored numbers, the new interpretation is in fact simpler than
the initial interpretation as only one half of the stimulus is considered and
the new interpretation can be conceptually described trivially as “2”. The
complexity of a previous and new interpretation is likely to affect mental
reinterpretation. Concretely, it requires less effort to replace a trivial inter-
pretation consisting of only very few mental concepts and at the same time
it is of less effort to form a new interpretation that is of very low complexity,
because it requires only very few “new” mental concepts to be identified.
3Such an assumed holistic representation of letters, numbers, and simple shapes might
very well be due to our strong familiarity and daily exposure to them as suggested by
Thomas (1999). Such a specific representation of letters and numbers is further supported
by the neuropsychological findings of selective neglect of letters (Goldenberg, 1993).
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The fact that the stimuli of Finke et al. (1989) were presented verbally
and not as usual in such studies visually likely adds to the success of their
mental reinterpretation. PIT assumes that the mental concepts underlying
mental imagery are the product of the integration of all modalities, which
means that in this case the mental concepts are derived from verbal input
only and such a verbal description is naturally much less restricting in terms
of concreteness and details than a visual presentation4. Consequently, the
plausibility of or converging evidence for a verbally given interpretation is
less strong than that derived from a more detailed visual presentation given
that everything else remains equal.
Summarizing, the stimuli (including both interpretations) that have been
shown to be comparatively easy to mentally reinterpret would be 1) concep-
tually represented very simply, i.e., one to very few parts and spatial rela-
tions, 2) their resemblance to real objects is weak or non-existent, and 3) in
case of a verbal presentation much less detailed and settled than for a visual
presentation. All these aspects decrease the plausibility of the initial inter-
pretation of these stimuli. The less plausible a current interpretation is, the
more likely it becomes to find a more plausible alternative interpretation,
i.e., successfully mentally reinterpret the mental image.
6.2.2 Why Mental Reinterpretation can be Improved
Section 2.1.1 reported the different factors that have been shown to signifi-
cantly improve mental reinterpretation of stimuli that are otherwise hard to
mentally reinterpret such as the duck-rabbit. These factors can be divided
into four groups: 1) explicit hints about reference frame manipulation and
identity of the to-be-discovered meaning, 2) training stimuli with the same
reference frame reversals, 3) partitioning of the stimulus during presenta-
tion, and 4) articulatory suppression during presentation of the stimulus.
Each of these four types of factors are discussed in the following.
Several studies reported that mental reinterpretation of ambiguous stim-
uli such as the duck-rabbit improve significantly when hints are provided
during reinterpretation (e.g., Reisberg & Chambers, 1991; Hyman & Neisser,
1991). Such hints include: 1) hints about what to “see”, e.g., telling partici-
pants that they are looking for an animal, and 2) hints about the alternative
reference-frame, e.g., “the front of the rabbit could be the back of another
animal” or “the left side is the new top”. According to PIT’s explanation
of why the duck-rabbit is hard to mentally reinterpret, these hints should
help mental reinterpretation because they specify that (and to some extent
how) the current interpretation should be discarded or altered. Reisberg
and Chambers (1991) report experiments in which participants were pre-
sented drawings which were rotated versions of meaningful stimuli such as
4The saying that “a picture is worth a 1000 words” seems to apply here.
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the shape of Texas. They discovered that the instruction to mentally rotate
the stimulus did not lead any of the participants to discover the shape of
Texas in their mental image. But the explicit hint to understand the left
side of their mental image as the new top, in fact, led to successful men-
tal reinterpretation for more than half of the participants. This striking
result supports PIT’s explanation that hints are successful because they ex-
plicitly induce a re-structuring of the conceptual description of the current
interpretation of the mental image. Whereas only mental rotation does not
induce such re-structuring but only changes the orientation while keeping
the current interpretation.
It has also been shown that participants that have been provided with
training examples of ambiguous drawings which include the same reference-
frame reversals as the later presented duck-rabbit show a significant increase
in successful mental reinterpretation (Peterson et al., 1992). Again, such
training likely increases the propensity of participants to discard the con-
ceptual description of the current interpretation thus aiding the ability to
draw an alternative interpretation.
Peterson et al. (1992), furthermore, showed that a partitioning of the am-
biguous stimuli significantly increases the success of mental reinterpretation.
In this study the ambiguous stimulus was presented in a piecemeal fashion
so that participants had to mentally “glue” the presented parts together to
get the complete stimulus. The fact that participants never perceived the
full stimulus could likely lead to a lower plausibility of their interpretation
than had they seen the full picture. This argument is similar to the one
made previously about the study of Finke et al. (1989) who presented their
stimuli verbally and not visually. In both cases the resulting initial interpre-
tation of the stimulus should be less fleshed-out and should contain less fixed
visual details than if one visually perceives the stimulus as a whole. This
aspect should negatively affect the current interpretation’s plausibility and
thus increase the likelihood of finding a new more plausible interpretation.
Brandimonte and Gerbino (1993) showed that the mental reinterpre-
tation of the duck-rabbit significantly improves when participants are in-
structed to loudly say “lalala” during the initial presentation of the duck-
rabbit. This procedure is termed articulatory suppression. This finding
can be explained because the mental concepts which underlie mental images
integrate multi-modal input. In the case of this study, the participants es-
sentially link nonsense verbal input to the visual input of the duck-rabbit.
Given that the conceptual description of the duck-rabbit contains informa-
tion from both these sources, the overall converging evidence for the found
interpretation is decreased as the verbal part simply does not fit with the
interpretation “duck” or “rabbit”. Given a therefore lower plausibility of
this interpretation the likelihood of replacing it with a more plausible inter-
pretation is again increased.
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6.2.3 Summary and Predictions
The phenomenon of mental reinterpretation is complex and includes many
different aspects such as the different types of stimuli and the different types
of hints. The interpretation process (as described in Section 3.1.6 and Sec-
tion 4.2) is fundamentally involved in the explanation of this phenomenon.
Also the interpretation process is at the heart of (categorical) perception
and thus a hard problem for which no formal implementation exists (see
Section 5.3.2). Accordingly, PIT’s explanations for the different aspects of
mental reinterpretation have been made on a descriptive level. It is there-
fore not possible to make predictions as concretely as for mental scanning
(Section 6.1) or eye movements (Section 6.3) for which the computational
model can be applied directly. This section will thus provide a summary of
the identified factors relevant for the success of mental reinterpretation and
more general predictions that follow from that.
The explanations of PIT showed why mental reinterpretation is gener-
ally very hard unless either specific simple stimuli are used or additional
hints and help is provided. The successful mental reinterpretation of a stim-
ulus without additional hints depends mainly on the overall plausibility of
the initial interpretation. The plausibility of the initial interpretation de-
termines the success of mental reinterpretation in so far as that discarding
the current interpretation (and replacing it with a new interpretation) be-
comes more likely the less plausible the initial interpretation is. Factors
that contribute to the plausibility of an interpretation are: 1) how realis-
tic the stimulus is and 2) how much converging evidence for the current
interpretation exists.
The first point is illustrated in Figure 6.3. The duck-rabbit on the left
side of the figure is predicted to be harder to mentally reinterpret than the
classic duck-rabbit5. This is because the duck-rabbit on the left side simply
looks much more like an actual rabbit or duck (whatever the initial interpre-
tation might be) and thus the initial interpretation will be more plausible
and therefore harder to “overwrite”. This example also shows the second
point, i.e., converging evidence for an interpretation, as the fur/feathers
texture present in the left duck-rabbit supports the initial interpretation.
Another way of varying converging evidence for ambiguous stimuli like the
duck-rabbit is the presentation of additional information such as presenting
sounds or verbal labels that would either support or provide evidence against
one of the interpretations. For example, presenting the duck-rabbit stimuli
together with a depiction of a pond, sounds made by ducks, or simply the
5As already mentioned the classic duck-rabbit has been shown to be very hard to
mentally reinterpret. Therefore, a comparison between the mental reinterpretation of the
two types of duck-rabbits would need to involve appropriate hints to induce successful
mental reinterpretation (see Section 2.1.2 for an overview of such hints).
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Figure 6.3: Two version of the duck-rabbit stimulus with different levels of
realism.
Figure 6.4: Variations of the “mirrored 3” stimulus of (Slezak, 1995). De-
picted are two possible variations of the “mirrored 3” stimulus which PIT
predicts to be harder to successfully mentally reinterpret, because the ini-
tially rather meaningless figure is assigned a concrete meaning (flower vase)
or made more realistic by adding details.
subtitle “duck” should lead to decreased rates of mental reinterpretation6.
Another way of testing the above factors is to vary them for stimuli which
have been shown to generally be mentally reinterpretable such as the “mir-
rored number” stimuli of Slezak (1995). These stimuli could be varied so
that their parts resemble actual objects more clearly. Figure 6.4 shows some
possibilities to make these stimuli more realistic and less abstract.
6Assuming that the initial interpretation is “duck” and the to-be-found interpretation
is “rabbit”.
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6.3 Eye Movements
As reviewed in Chapter 2, the literature reports the robust occurrence of
spontaneous eye movements during mental imagery. These eye movements
reflect the content of the mental image and have been shown to be func-
tional in mental imagery. In particular, the recall of memories using mental
imagery is negatively affected qualitatively and quantitatively when partic-
ipants have to maintain a fixed gaze. Furthermore, individual differences
in the spatial dispersion of such spontaneous eye movements have been re-
ported.
6.3.1 Eye Movements in PIT
The computational model of PIT directly incorporates spontaneous eye
movements during mental imagery because saccades are part of the percep-
tual actions used in visual perception. During mental imagery these same
perceptual actions are employed to instantiate the conceptual description
a mental image is based on. The model implements a distinction between
overt and covert attention shifts. Overt attention shifts are assumed to
correspond to, in particular, spontaneous eye movements, whereas covert
attention shifts correspond to non-observable attention shifts such as within
the periphery of one’s gaze. The distinction between overt and covert at-
tention shifts is made based on the length of the vector that represents the
attention shift. That is, vectors with a length larger than the a-priori set
threshold, will be executed as overt attention shifts, i.e., eye movements.
This means that if attention is shifted beyond a certain distance from the
current focus of attention, the attention shift will be observable as a spon-
taneous eye movement.
6.3.2 Functionality of Eye Movements
In PIT, attention shifts are functional for mental imagery; they reflect the
currently processed content and their suppression will restrict instantiation
and thereby the generation and inspection of the mental image. These
properties follow straight-forwardly from the fact that mental imagery is
realized by the instantiation of mental concepts and that the process of
instantiation is realized by employing perceptual actions such as (overt)
attention shifts. If the spatial relation left-of is instantiated during mental
imagery this could be realized by a respective eye movement which would
then also directly reflect the currently imagined spatial relation. If eye
movements are suppressed then consequently instantiation is inhibited. This
means that the processing of the mental image is inhibited in so far as overt
attention shifts cannot be executed. This will restrict the generation and
inspection of the mental image. It has been shown that keeping a fixed
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gaze during mental imagery produces such inhibitions in recalling content
of the mental image independent of how the to-be-imagined stimulus has
been presented previously, i.e., verbally or visually. This finding is in line
with PIT’s assumption that the mental concepts underlying mental images
are the result of the integration of all modalities. That is, the instantiation
is not directly related to the mode of perception of the to-be-instantiated
mental concept.
Another aspect of the inhibition of mental imagery due to keeping a
fixed gaze is the fact that not only the amount of information, e.g., the
number of recalled entities of the stimulus, is decreased, but, additionally,
also the quality of what is recalled, i.e., the type of information, changes
when eye movements are inhibited. Johansson, Holsanova, Dewhurst, and
Holmqvist (2011) reported that participants would rather recall global and
more abstract information about the stimulus such as “it was a living room”
or “the walls were colored in blue” when gaze was kept fixed during imagery.
In contrast, the descriptions given in the condition in which eyes could move
freely rather referred to referents, states and events of the stimulus, e.g., “the
man was digging”. It is pointed out that the former more global information
would also be expected to be perceived during visual perception with a
fixed gaze, because it refers to the type of information that can be gathered
through a single fixation and the surrounding peripheral information. This
exact analogy between (fixed gaze) vision and (fixed gaze) imagery is also
found in the computational model. An eye movement (i.e., an overt attention
shift) is employed exactly when attention is to be shifted beyond what would
be accessible by covert attention shifts. This means, the model could also
only instantiate that information that requires no such overt attention shifts
in a simulation of a fixed gaze mental imagery task. That information would
then naturally be of the kind reported for fixed gaze vision, i.e., rather global
and abstract information.
6.3.3 Individual Differences in Eye Movements
The dispersion of spontaneous eye movements during mental imagery is
subject to individual differences and has been linked to the participants’
score in the “Object Spatial Imagery and Verbal Questionnaire” (OSIVQ)
of Blazhenkova and Kozhevnikov (2009). This questionnaire assesses indi-
vidual differences in cognitive style with respect to one’s ability and prefer-
ence to use object imagery (i.e., visual mental imagery) and spatial mental
imagery. The two scores for object and spatial mental imagery are neg-
atively correlated to each other which indicates a trade-off between the
two types of mental imagery (Kozhevnikov, Blazhenkova, & Becker, 2010).
Johansson, Holsanova, and Holmqvist (2010) report a negative correlation
between the spatial dispersion of eye movements during mental imagery and
the spatial mental imagery score of the OSIVQ. That is, the stronger the
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Table 6.3: Types of attention shifts for the generation of a mental image
with and without shape information. The island depicted in Figure 6.5 is
imagined as a mental image without shape information and including shape
information.
Attention Shifts (AS) Shapes No Shapes
Total Overt AS 9 0
Total Covert AS 8 3
Overt/Covert for Spatial Relations 3/0 0/3
preference/ability of a person to use spatial mental imagery, the lower the
dispersion of spontaneous eye movements will be. There are two ways to
account for this finding that can be derived from the model of PIT. The
first possibility is that people with a preference to use spatial mental im-
agery have the skill of using spatial mental imagery very efficiently. Such
efficiency could be understood as being able to instantiate spatial mental
concepts, such as spatial relations, with particularly short attention shifts.
That is, the concept left-of would be instantiated by a shorter vector by a
participant with a high spatial mental imagery score than for a participant
with a lower spatial mental imagery score. The shorter the vectors used in
the instantiation process, the faster one can imagine spatial configurations,
because reaction times depend on the length of the attention shift. This aids
one’s ability (and thereby likely also one’s preference) to use spatial mental
imagery. Shorter attention shifts naturally lead to a lower dispersion of the
overall pattern of (overt) attention shifts.
The second possibility offered by the model is that people with a high
spatial mental imagery score will mentally imagine much less visual infor-
mation, e.g., shapes, textures, than a person with a low spatial imagery
score. The reason is that the spatial mental imagery score is negatively cor-
related with the object (i.e., visual) imagery score which indicates the pref-
erence/ability to imagine visual information. When less shape information
is instantiated, the instantiation of the spatial relations will in consequence
utilize shorter attention shifts. The reason is that the instantiation of, for
example, left-of is context-sensitive so that available perceptual information
of the shape of a referenced entity will affect the length of the vector of left-
of proportional to the extent of the entity’s (imagined) shape. Section 3.2.2
and Section 5.1.3 elaborate on the mechanisms of this context-sensitivity.
Concretely, when the shape of an entity is not instantiated, its shape is ab-
stracted to a point with no extent. For such a shape-less entity the length of
the spatial relations is not affected so that the default short length is used.
This property of the model can be observed in Figure 6.5. Table 6.3 shows
a comparison of the employed overt and covert attention shifts for the two
conditions.
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Figure 6.5: Output of two simulations of the model. The scene of the
island depicted on the top is imagined by the model in two conditions: 1)
including the visual information of the entities’ shapes, and 2) without shape
information of the entities. Table 6.3 summarizes the resulting overt and
covert attention shifts.
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6.3.4 Predictions
The model makes predictions about the occurrence of spontaneous eye move-
ments during mental imagery.
The size of an attention shift, i.e., the length of the vector, that is em-
ployed during instantiation is the crucial factor that determines whether the
attention shift will be executed covertly or overtly. The distance of an atten-
tion shift is determined by two main factors: 1) the distance of the spatial
relation in the conceptual description of the to-be-imagined stimulus, and 2)
the concrete vector upon which a spatial relation such as the mental concept
left-of will be mapped onto by the select function of the VS-LTM.
The first point is trivial, as the properties of the given stimulus are
encoded on a conceptual level, i.e., as sets of mental concepts such as left-of
or left-of, close or left-of, far. In mental imagery, these mental concepts
will be mapped onto attention shifts that reflect the conceptually described
distance of the spatial relation. The second point can be subdivided into
two further aspects: 1) individual differences, and 2) content of the to-be-
imagined stimulus. Individual differences can determine how, for example,
a prototypical left-of is instantiated. Such differences are the result of how
the mappings of the select function of the VS-LTM have been learned and
in which context they are commonly used. The second aspect is the content
that is imagined and this aspect can be easily tested empirically. The model
of PIT instantiates spatial relations so that the available context of the
spatial relation is considered. This aspect has already been discussed in
Section 6.3.3. Essentially, the availability of perceptual information about
shapes will affect the instantiation of the related spatial relations so that
the vectors of the spatial relation are adjusted in their length. They will
get longer proportional to the extent of the imagined shapes of the entities
which the spatial relations refer to.
From these two main points, the following predictions regarding the oc-
currence of spontaneous eye movements that reflect the content of the mental
image are inferred.
• The more visual information, i.e., specifically shapes, is contained in
a mental image, the more eye movements are expected;
• The more complex a mental image is, i.e., the more entities and thus
necessarily spatial relations it contains, the more eye movements are
expected;
• The former two points can be summarized by the prediction that the
more realistic and rich in detail the mental image is, the more eye
movements are expected;
• The longer the distances in a mental image are, the more likely eye
movements become;
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• The larger the shapes in a mental image are, the more likely eye move-
ments become.
A concrete experiment to both test PIT’s explanations and predictions
about eye movements and mental scanning (see Section 6.1.2) would be the
reproduction of the mental scanning experiment of Richman et al. (1979)
with the addition of eye tracking so that the participants’ gaze is recorded
during mental imagery. PIT would predict that spontaneous eye movements
occur and reflect the different imagined distances of specifically the “20
miles” and “80 miles” routes. That is, these eye movements would reflect
the integration of the given metrics of the island stimulus and the additional
suggested (inconsistent) distances of the sign posts. A verification of this
prediction would strongly support the assumption that mental images rely
on mental concepts which can include potentially conflicting information
and that attention shifts such as eye movements are used to instantiate these
mental concepts so that the integrated direction and distance is reflected in
the concrete attention shifts.
Note that PIT does not automatically predict the non-employment of
mental imagery if no relevant eye movements occur during a given task.
It is possible that the task at hand does not elicit such eye movements
because the required conditions are not given. For example, many spatial
reasoning tasks used in the literature on mental model reasoning (e.g., Jahn,
Knauff, & Johnson-Laird, 2007) are very abstract and contain no or very
little (relevant) visual information, e.g., “A is left of B; B is above C; what
is the relation between A and C”. The relationship between mental model
theory and PIT with respect to the role of eye movements in such tasks is
discussed in Section 7.2.2.
6.4 Unilateral Neglect
Unilateral neglect in visual perception (visual neglect) and in mental im-
agery (imaginal neglect) are complex neuropsychological phenomena whose
underlying mechanisms are not fully understood. Any attempt to explain
unilateral neglect and its properties requires a much broader scope than that
offered by a theory of mental imagery. Therefore, an explanation of unilat-
eral neglect is not the goal of this section. Instead, it will be discussed if and
how PIT is compatible with the empirical findings of unilateral neglect. The
reason unilateral neglect is considered in this thesis is that it poses strong
constraints on theories of mental imagery and it has been argued that both
the descriptive and the pictorial theory are inconsistent with the findings on
unilateral neglect (see Section 2.3.4).
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6.4.1 Unilateral Neglect and PIT
As reported in Chapter 2, the underlying causes of unilateral neglect are
assumed to be an interplay of several different deficits with varying sever-
ity. Yet, specifically the role of exogenous attention, i.e., attention triggered
by external cues such as appearing objects, is accepted to play a major
role in visual neglect (Bartolomeo & Chokron, 2002, 2001; Bourlon et al.,
2010). A deficit in exogenous attention causes the patients’ attention to
be overly strongly drawn towards cues on their non-neglected side of their
visual field. This effectively leads to the failure to properly attend to ob-
jects on their neglected side7. According to PIT both visual perception and
mental imagery generally employ the same perceptual mechanisms and thus
also the same attentional processes. There is, however, a difference with
respect to attention between visual perception and mental imagery in PIT
that has been discussed in Section 3.2.6: bottom-up attention plays no role
in mental imagery where attention is controlled by top-down guidance only.
The instantiation of mental concepts is exactly such a top-down guidance
as attention shifts are perceptual actions which are selected based on the
available mental concepts and instantiated perceptual information. In vi-
sual perception, in contrast, it is fundamental that attention is also drawn
to salient cues in our visual field in a bottom-up fashion. The distinction
between bottom-up and top-down attention is the same as the distinction
between exogenous and endogenous attention in the literature on unilateral
neglect. Given that bottom-up attention shifts are relevant for visual per-
ception but not mental imagery, damage to respective neural areas involved
in bottom-up but not top-down attention, could explain the occurrence of
visual neglect without imaginal neglect (Bartolomeo, D’Erme, & Gainotti,
1994; Rode et al., 2010; Bourlon et al., 2010). This would also explain why
only few patients with visual neglect also show signs of imaginal neglect
(Bartolomeo, 2007) as imaginal neglect would additionally require damage
to brain areas involved in top-down attention processes. Under the assump-
tion that deficits in bottom-up, or exogenous, attention cause visual neglect
but not imaginal neglect, PIT is consequently consistent with the occurrence
of visual neglect without imaginal neglect.
The case of imaginal neglect without visual neglect seems slightly more
difficult. Deficits in top-down attention with healthy bottom-up attention
should intuitively lead to deficits in both vision and imagery as both ob-
viously depend on top-down guidance of attention. It has, however, been
argued that patients showing only imaginal neglect but not visual neglect
might have initially shown symptoms of both neglects, but over time adapted
7Other deficits are likely relevant in combination with such a deficit in exogenous
attention. For example, it has been proposed that an inability to properly disengage
attention from those objects on the non-neglected side additionally plays a role in visual
neglect (e.g., Posner, Walker, Friedrich, & Rafal, 1984).
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and learned to compensate their visual neglect to the point at which symp-
toms are hardly noticeable (Bartolomeo, 2007). Such a compensation would
have to then rely on aspects that are only given in vision but not imagery,
perhaps a stronger reliance on bottom-up attention.
Additionally, Rode et al. (2010) report on two patients, one suffering
from both visual and imaginal neglect and one suffering from imaginal ne-
glect only. They compared the specific damaged brain areas of the two
patients and proposed that damage disconnecting the posterior callosal in
the patient suffering only imaginal neglect might prevent a symmetrical pro-
cessing of spatial information from long-term memory. Such an explanation
of imaginal neglect could easily be incorporated into the model of PIT as
an inhibition of (top-down) attention shifts during mental imagery. Those
top-down attention shifts that would be directed into the neglected half of
the underlying coordinate system could be inhibited. Such a manipulation
would work to simulate imaginal neglect for scenes (in which objects located
on one side could consequently not be instantiated), objects (for which parts
on one of their sides could not be instantiated), and single shapes of objects
(which would only be partially instantiated so that the resulting shape infor-
mation would be incomplete, i.e., lacking those contours from the neglected
side). The reason why such a simulation of imaginal neglect would work
for all these cases is that the employed coordinate system is not absolute
but the origin of the coordinate system of PIT’s model is relative to the
currently imagined entity or scene.
Summarizing, given the above assumptions from the literature on uni-
lateral neglect, PIT is in principle able to account for visual and imaginal
neglect and their dissociation. As PIT is more concretely described, its
consistency with the results of unilateral neglect also serves the purpose of
clarifying more concretely how the enactive theory could be consistent with
these results (as it was already suspected by Bartolomeo (2002)).
6.5 Summary
In this chapter PIT was applied to all considered phenomena of mental
imagery including specifically the more detailed aspects. PIT and its imple-
mentation were shown to provide explanations and predictions for mental
scanning, mental reinterpretation, and eye movements during mental im-
agery. PIT was shown to be in principle consistent with the constraints
posed by the findings on unilateral neglect. For the phenomena of mental
scanning and eye movements the implemented mechanisms of the compu-
tational model were directly applicable and simulations supported the pro-
posed explanations. Overall, the explanations and predictions of PIT and its
computational model go considerably beyond the explanations of the three
contemporary theories (see Section 2.3).
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Outlook
”But if it is asked whether the devils could have deluded the on-
lookers by the above-mentioned method of working upon the men-
tal images, and not by assuming aerial bodies like flying birds,
the answer is that they could have done so.”
(Malleus Maleficarum Part 2, Chapter VIII)
This chapter discusses the contributions of the thesis and gives an out-
look on future work.
7.1 Contributions
7.1.1 Contributions to the Imagery Debate
PIT and its computational model make contributions to some of the most
fundamental questions of the imagery debate. These questions are 1) does
mental imagery rely on a depictive mental representation?; 2) how can the
spatio-analogical character of mental imagery be explained?; and 3) are
modality-specific representations and processes functionally involved in men-
tal imagery?
The computational model of PIT constitutes a proof of concept that
mental imagery does not require a depictive mental representation. That
is, the computational model provides a concrete example how the spatio-
analogical character of mental imagery, for example, evident in mental scan-
ning, need not result from a specifically structured mental representation
(as assumed by the pictorial theory) or from the non-functional application
of tacit knowledge (as assumed by the descriptive theory) but can result
from the employment of perceptual actions. The temporal properties of
covertly or overtly employing these perceptual actions determine the tem-
poral properties of mental imagery. That is, the physical structure of the
human visual system gives mental imagery its spatio-analogical character.
In this respect, PIT provides support to the enactive theory by providing
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a more formal framework and a concrete model that build upon the enac-
tive theory’s assumption that attentional processes of visual perception are
re-used in mental imagery.
PIT proposes the functional involvement of modality-specific processes
of visual perception in mental imagery. However, these processes are gener-
ally aimed at the inspection of external stimuli and not at internal mental
representations. Specifically, the involvement of modality-specific represen-
tations of early visual areas is not necessary, because perceptual informa-
tion of a mental image can be retrieved by processes of proprioception and
anticipation without the need for recurrent activation of early visual rep-
resentations. This assumption of PIT, furthermore, allows the otherwise
conflicting neuroimaging results on the activation of early visual areas dur-
ing mental imagery to be resolved, as such activation can now be argued to
be non-functional.
Additionally, the computational model of PIT constitutes a first step
towards a model-based investigation of the questions of the imagery debate.
The computational model can in the future be compared to implementa-
tions of other theories of mental imagery. The development and comparison
of theories using computational models should allow for a more efficient
progress on the questions of the imagery debate. A comparison of imple-
mented theories will reduce misunderstandings between researchers of the
different theories as implemented concepts and processes are less ambiguous
and more transparent.
The application of the computation model to the phenomena of mental
imagery resulted in several concrete predictions. Ways of empirically test-
ing these predictions have been proposed. Future empirical work of testing
these prediction can provide stronger evidence for PIT as well as suggest
corrections and refinements for the framework and model. This way the
computational model can facilitate a tighter coupling of theory and experi-
ments which can further support efficient progress of our knowledge on the
nature of mental imagery.
7.1.2 Contributions to the Understanding of the Empirical
Phenomena of Mental Imagery
The application of PIT and its computational model to the different phe-
nomena of mental imagery led to explanations that covered aspects which
were previously only discussed on a vague level. The explanations provided
by PIT aid a deeper understanding of these aspects.
In the context of mental scanning, the important concept of cognitive
penetration was covered. The computational model provides the first mech-
anistic account of how and why cognitive penetration affects mental im-
agery. What is cognitively penetrated, or altered, are the mental concepts
that conceptually describe the mental image. Based on these mental con-
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cepts perceptual information is generated which will then also be altered
as it constitutes an instance of the mental concepts. This way the percep-
tual information of the mental image will reflect a participant’s belief and
knowledge.
The recent finding that spontaneous eye movements during mental im-
agery not only reflect the content of the mental image but are in fact func-
tional for mental imagery is incorporated in PIT and implemented in the
computational model. Eye movements in mental imagery have been the
topic of recent discussion and their concrete role remained unclear. The
model gives a mechanistic account of how eye movements are functionally
involved for the generation and inspection of mental imagery as they are
employed for the instantiation of mental concepts. That is, spontaneous
eye movements during mental imagery can be understood as a means to
make an abstract mental concept concrete through the “replay” of its per-
ception. This understanding automatically gives an explanation for the fact
that these eye movements have been found to correspond to the content of
mental images.
The explanations of PIT for the findings on mental reinterpretation show
how and why a mental image is necessarily always interpreted. Several re-
searchers (e.g., Fodor, 1975; Chambers & Reisberg, 1992; Cornoldi, Logie,
Brandimonte, Kaufmann, & Reisberg, 1996) have proposed that mental im-
ages always come with an interpretation or caption and PIT’s model provides
concrete support for these assumptions. In PIT a mental image corresponds
to an interpretation drawn from a set of mental concepts with instantiated
perceptual information.
Although not aiding the understanding of unilateral neglect, it was shown
that PIT and its model can be consistent with the findings on unilateral
neglect. A consistency of these findings with theories of mental imagery
was not available before. Rather these findings have been interpreted to be
inconsistent with the pictorial and the descriptive theory.
7.1.3 Contributions to the Enactive Theory
PIT contributes to the development of the enactive theory in that the as-
sumption of the enactive theory that perception is active vision with an
emphasis on the interaction with the environment instead of the inspection
of internal mental representations is adopted and fleshed out in the for-
mal framework and the computational model. PIT’s implementation offers
a concrete way of understanding the previously only abstractly described
schemata proposed by the enactive theory. The VS-LTM and its functions
select and identify correspond to the schemata and furthermore link them
to the concept of grounded symbols. This linkage allows the ideas of the
enactive theory to be embedded into common frameworks of cognitive sys-
tems, e.g., systems including long-term memory and working memory based
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on (grounded) symbols.
Furthermore, the similarity of PIT with the enactive theory should allow
a transfer of (some of) the explanations given by PIT for the phenomena of
mental imagery to the enactive theory.
7.1.4 Contributions to Embodied Cognition
The paradigm of embodied cognition is the currently prevalent paradigm
in cognitive psychology and cognitive science for understanding the nature
of cognition. The previously dominant paradigm of computationalism (or
cognitivism) emphasized the role and importance of rich internal mental
representations of the world for cognition. Embodied cognition, in contrast,
emphasizes the sensorimotor interactions of an organism with its environ-
ment, i.e., action and perception capabilities, as constitutive of cognition.
Cognition is understood as bootstrapped from acquired sensorimotor inter-
actions and their internal simulation (e.g., Hesslow, 2012) and/or symbols
grounded in these interactions (e.g., Barsalou, 1999). The contemporary
theories of mental imagery with the exception of the enactive theory are
rooted in the previous paradigm with a focus on the role of mental repre-
sentations.
PIT is an example of a theory that is rooted in the concepts of embodied
cognition. Mental imagery in PIT is realized by the simulation of sensori-
motor interactions and their (anticipated) feedback. Furthermore, the non-
brain body of an organism plays a critical role in PIT as proprioception of
the state of muscles yields perceptual information during mental imagery.
Lastly, PIT’s mental concepts are an example of grounded symbols which
implement associations between actions and perceptions. Accordingly, the
computational model can be interpreted as a concrete instance of embodied
cognition for the domain of visuo-spatial mental imagery. PIT’s applicability
to a wide range of diverse phenomena of mental imagery provides support
to the validity of these implemented assumptions of embodied cognition.
7.2 Outlook
The section is divided into two parts: 1) extending the model of PIT and 2)
comparing and/or complementing PIT with other theories of visuo-spatial
information processing.
7.2.1 Extending the Model of PIT
PIT assumes that mental imagery relies on acquired procedural knowledge of
visual perception (see Section 3.1.3). Accordingly, the computational model
of PIT also requires such procedural knowledge. In particular, the following
information is necessary:
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• knowledge about what entities/relations exist (to inform mental con-
cepts);
• knowledge of the likelihood of perceiving a certain entity/relation in a
certain situation (to inform the functions interpret and select);
• knowledge how to perceive a given entity/relation (to inform the func-
tions select and identify).
Currently, this knowledge has been designed and put into the model. If
this knowledge could instead be autonomously acquired, that would make a
stronger case for the plausibility and validity of the theory and model. How-
ever, the domain of human perception is so complex and still insufficiently
understood, that the acquisition of such knowledge is highly difficult (see
Section 5.3.2 for more details on this point). There is, however, the possi-
bility of implementing the model of PIT on an artificial system such as a
robot so that the system is able to learn this knowledge itself over time. The
reason why such an approach is possible for an artificial system but hardly
so for a model of human cognition, is that the internals of a robot are fully
known and common robotic systems are much simpler than humans with
respect to their perception and action capabilities.
It is a fundamental assumption of PIT as well as of theories of embodied
cognition, in particular, perceptual symbol systems (Barsalou, 1999) and
the simulation theory of cognition (Hesslow, 2012), that such knowledge is
acquired and used for mental imagery and simulations. The internal simula-
tions assumed by the two theories of embodied cognition can be understood
as the “offline” employment of processes of perception and action. Mental
imagery as proposed by PIT is exactly such simulations with two exceptions:
1) mental imagery is conscious whereas simulations are largely subconscious
and 2) mental imagery employs perceptual actions not only covertly but also
overtly, e.g., eye movements, whereas simulations are generally assumed to
rely on the covert employment of actions.
Mental imagery can thus be seen as a special (conscious) case of the
simulations proposed by the above mentioned theories. The theories of em-
bodied cognition propose that these simulations constitute cognition so that
thought corresponds to the simulation of acting and mentally perceiving the
consequences of the actions. However, it remains an unsolved problem how
exactly such simulations are acquired and realized and how they can give
rise to further cognitive abilities.
There is previous computational work (e.g., Ziemke, Jirenhed, & Hess-
low, 2005; Moeller & Schenk, 2008) that showed how tasks such as collision-
free navigation and simple object recognition can be realized by acquired
sensorimotor interactions and the simulations of such interactions in simu-
lated robots. Computational investigations on the question how simulations
are acquired and how aspects of high-level cognition can emerge from these
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simulations is regarded a necessary next step in research on embodied cogni-
tion (e.g., Pezzulo et al., 2011; Barsalou, 2010). Therefore, it is a promising
future endeavor to investigate how the computational model of PIT can be
bootstrapped from acquired sensorimotor interactions. This would not only
provide stronger support for PIT and its model, but potentially provide
insight on the fundamental assumptions of embodied cognition.
The following outlines one way of bootstrapping the computational model
of PIT from sensorimotor interactions.
Bootstrapping PIT From Sensorimotor Interactions
Similarly, to previous studies on bootstrapping behavior from sensorimotor
interactions (Ziemke et al., 2005; Moeller & Schenk, 2008), a simple simu-
lated domain and a simulated robot would be used. Let’s concretely assume
a simple agent in a domain containing free spaces and obstacles. The agent
is able to move in different directions. In the following, I will show how the
processes and representations of PIT can be transferred and acquired from
an autonomous exploration of the agent in the domain.
Mental concepts in PIT are abstracted descriptions of situations. They
are grounded in the actions that are available and meaningful for the de-
scribed situation. This concept can be directly applied to the assumed
domain. The agent can learn which actions, i.e., movements, are useful
in different situations. That is, it learns to link a perception to a set of
actions. It does so by abstracting the perception to a category. These cat-
egories are defined by which actions are afforded by the perceptions of that
category (for the concept of affordances, see, e.g., Gibson, 1986). Categories
are learned by feedback on the agent’s actions in different situations. Con-
cretely, moving into a wall leads to negative feedback and moving into free
space leads to positive feedback. What is learned from this feedback is the
function identify which maps the robot’s actual or imagined perceptions
onto mental concepts. Figure 7.1 gives examples of mental concepts in the
domain.
Internal models will be used to learn the functions select and execute.
Internal models are the common approach to learn and engage in goal-
directed sensorimotor interactions, that is, to learn how to act in a given
situation given a certain goal (Kawato, 1999). There is evidence that the
human brain implements such internal models for this purpose (Wolpert,
Miall, & Kawato, 1998). Internal models usually comprise of two types of
models: forward models and inverse models. A forward model receives an
action as input and outputs the predicted change in perception. An inverse
model receives the current perception as well as a goal state or a motivation
and outputs that action which is predicted to change the current perception
towards the goal state.
In PIT the function select selects an action given a set of mental con-
118
Figure 7.1: The figure gives an example how perceptions can be abstracted
to mental concepts based on affordances. The perception of the agent is his
surrounding. The grey fields represent obstacles. The function identify has
been trained to identify viable actions for a given perception. Perceptions
are categorized based on the actions that they afford. Using this abstraction
concepts such as different corners, corridors, and dead-ends emerge.
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cepts. In the domain, select is learned as an inverse model that suggests an
action given the current mental concepts. As mental concepts are categories
that contain the viable actions, select has to learn which of the available
actions will meet the agent’s goals. For example, such an inverse model
could be learned based on the goal to not employ an action inverse to the
previous one, e.g., going right after going left. That would mean, that even
though the mental concept “corner” offers two viable actions, select will be
trained to take the option that meets this goal.
In PIT the function execute internally simulates an action to provide
perceptual information. Execute can be learned as a forward model. That
is, it will simply learn how perceptions change given an action, e.g., moving
to the left leads obstacles in the perception to “move” to the right. Such
a forward model can then predict the next perception given an action. As
a perception is internally abstracted to mental concepts, execute will have
to fill in unknown parts of the perception, i.e., create a concrete instance of
the abstract mental concept. This filling-in process can be based on learned
statistics of the domain, e.g., which concrete “corner” is most likely.
The function interpret interprets an ambiguous set of mental concepts
in PIT. The domain described here is too simple to provide such ambiguous
situations. However, for a more complex domain interpret can be learned
by using a statistical measure of how likely different interpretations are for
a given domain and a given situation. That is, the likelihood of different
perceptions in the domain.
The above showed how PIT can in principle be bootstrapped from senso-
rimotor interactions. However, in the above assumed domain the capability
of mental imagery would not be of much use. It is promising to further
extend the simple domain with more complicated tasks for the agent such
as finding resources and exploring the world. Mental imagery as internal
simulation could then be used as a planning tool for these tasks. Such an
extension could be of high relevance for embodied cognition as it might pro-
vide a concrete proof-of-concept that abilities such as planning and reasoning
can be bootstrapped from sensorimotor interactions via mental imagery.
7.2.2 PIT and Other Theories of Visuo-Spatial Information
Processing
In the following, potential future work of comparing, combining, or comple-
menting other theories of visuo-spatial information processing, i.e., visuo-
spatial working memory and the mental model theory, with PIT is briefly
discussed.
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Visuo-Spatial Working Memory
The visuo-spatial working memory theory (VSWM) (Logie, 2003) is a well-
established and well-supported theory of working memory. It proposes that
working memory consists of multiple components which are each specialized
mental systems that deal with particular types of information and particular
types of manipulations of information. One such component is the visual
cache with the inner scribe. The visual cache operates as a passive visual
temporary store while the inner scribe is associated with attentional control
and is involved in planning and executing movements. In contrast to the
visual buffer of the pictorial theory of mental imagery (Kosslyn et al., 2006),
the visual cache is not directly linked to visual perception but instead the
visual cache holds information that has been processed and interpreted by
visual perception and respective background knowledge. The visual buffer
is critically different than the visual cache as it directly processes sensory
input and mediates it to long-term memory.
This difference between the visual buffer on the one hand and the vi-
sual cache on the other hand, has led to a recent discussion about whether
the proposed structures overlap to some degree or whether they are distinct
(e.g., Borst, Niven, & Logie, 2012; Meulen, Logie, & Sala, 2009). These
investigations might form the basis of a unification of the two theories. In
the following, I will briefly discuss how PIT (as an alternative to the picto-
rial theory and as potentially overlapping with structures of the VSWM) is
consistent with the results of the study of Borst et al. (2012), who compare
properties of the visual buffer (of the pictorial theory) with the visual cache
(of the VSWM).
Borst et al. (2012) report three experiments that investigated whether
the cognitive processes underlying mental image generation and short-term
retention of mental images are the same or different. They employed two
interference conditions: spatial tapping and irrelevant visual input (IVI).
Their results provide support for the following conclusions. Retention of
mental images is realized in a representation different than the one used for
the generation of mental images. The retention would be realized by the
visual cache which is not disrupted by IVI as it is not directly connected to
visual perception but holds the already processed and interpreted content
of mental imagery. The generation of mental images would be realized by
the visual buffer which is disrupted by IVI because it is located in the early
areas of the visual cortex. Spatial tapping interfered only to a lesser degree
with the generation of mental images in the visual buffer which is assumed
to not be involved in the (blind) spatial tapping task. Spatial tapping did
interfere with the retention of information in the visual cache, which is to
be expected as the visual cache is also involved in executing movement (via
the inner scribe).
Summarizing, the study proposes that the visual buffer of the pictorial
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theory is used to construct mental images which are then immediately stored
in the visual cache of the VSWM.
In PIT we can find corresponding structures and processes for the visual
buffer and the visual cache. The generation of mental images is realized
by the process of instantiation which employs different perceptual processes
including overt and covert attention shifts. Instantiation would therefore
be expected to be disrupted by IVI as it would cause bottom-up triggered
attention shifts which would interfere with those attention shifts executed
for instantiation. Perceptual information generated through instantiation is
stored in short-term memory and extends the corresponding mental concepts
at which point it would not be expected to interfere with IVI. The short-term
memory holding the instantiated perceptual information would accordingly
correspond to the visual cache. Spatial tapping involves top-down guided
movements and can thus be assumed to rely on perceptual feedback and thus
employ the same (multi-modal) short-term memory as perceptual feedback
from mental imagery. Therefore, the interference between spatial tapping
and the mental image in PIT’s short-term memory would be expected.
It would be an interesting topic of investigation to compare PIT to the
the VSWM framework in more depth. This could go along two different
directions. One direction would be the investigation how PIT is generally
consistent or inconsistent with the vast literature on interference studies
and neuropsychological results that provide support for the structure and
functions of the components of the VSWM (e.g., Logie, 1995). The other
direction would be to investigate to which extent the explanations of PIT for
the phenomena considered in this thesis can be transferred to the framework
of the VSWM. Given the prima facie compatibility of PIT with the VSWM,
the successful transfer of the relatively detailed explanations of PIT and its
model could provide one concrete instance of the VSWM framework for the
phenomena considered in this thesis. This would additionally provide an
easy way of linking concepts of embodied cognition as realized in PIT to the
established VSWM framework.
Mental Model Theory and Preferences in Reasoning
Mental model theory (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2001) is an established and well-
supported theory on human reasoning including specifically reasoning with
visuo-spatial information. Mental model theory postulates that there are
three representational levels involved in human reasoning: propositional rep-
resentations, mental models, and mental images (Johnson-Laird, 1998). The
relationships between these three levels are hierarchical in the sense that the
more specific representation depends on the information of the more gen-
eral representation. The example in Figure 7.2 helps to illustrate this point.
It has been shown that there is a considerable overlap between the mental
model theory and the pictorial theory of mental imagery (Sima, Schultheis, &
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Figure 7.2: The three levels of the mental model theory. The bottom rep-
resents the propositional level, i.e., language-like descriptions. The middle
level is the mental model level which is a specification of the more general
propositional level, because a mental model might only represent one of
many valid configurations described by the propositions. In the depicted
example there are two valid configurations given the propositional premises.
The upper level is the mental image level which again is a specification of the
more general mental model level, because it additionally specifies properties
that the underlying mental model representation might be invariant to, such
as color, distance, and shape. As depicted a variety of valid specifications
are possible.
Barkowsky, 2013). The two theories assume the same or at least very similar
representational levels, structures of mental representations, and anatomical
localizations. This overlap makes it likely that the two theories describe the
same reasoning apparatus while, however, focussing on different aspects of
it. It would be a promising future endeavor to investigate how and to which
extent PIT is comparable to mental model theory and which extensions
would be necessary for it to account for the specific reasoning phenomena,
such as preferred mental models, that the mental model theory has been
successfully applied to (e.g. Jahn et al., 2007). In the following, a first
application of PIT to preferred mental models is described.
A recent study (Sima et al., 2013) has tested the explicit claim of mental
model theory that human reasoning is realized on the level of mental models
and that the employment of visual mental images can even impede this
reasoning process when visual information is irrelevant to the reasoning task
at hand (Knauff & Johnson-Laird, 2002). The study used three-term series
spatial reasoning problems of the form: “X is west of Y” (premise 1), “Z
is north-east of X” (premise 2), “What is the relation between Z and Y?”
(conclusion). These problems are under-specified, that is, there are different
answers which are valid given the premises. Figure 7.3 depicts the different
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Figure 7.3: Different valid solutions for a spatial reasoning task. The figure
shows the four valid solutions for the spatial reasoning task: “X is west of
Y” and “Z is north-east of X”; “What is the relation between Z and Y?”.
The solutions are from left to right: “west”, “north-west”, “north”, and
“north-east”.
valid answers for the above example. Problems of this type are commonly
used to study preferred mental models. A preferred mental model is a robust
within-subject and between-subject preference for one of many valid answers
(e.g., Jahn et al., 2007).
The study used the above reasoning tasks for two experiments which
only differed in their instructions.
The first experiment (the mental model experiment) used no instructions
other than just asking participants to solve the tasks as it is common for
studies investigating reasoning with mental models. In the second experi-
ment (the imagery experiment) the instructions were designed to induce the
employment of visual mental images, i.e., “imagine the letters as cities on a
map”. Note that the induced visual information of imagining the letters as
cities on a map is irrelevant to the actual reasoning task which is the same
in both experiments. The study found two main results: 1) only in the im-
agery experiment a majority of participants showed significant spontaneous
eye movements along the given spatial relations of the tasks1, and 2) there
were significant preferences for one of the different solutions, but they did
differ between the two experiments. The critical finding is the second one,
that is, the fact that the employment of visual mental imagery even with
irrelevant visual information has led to different reasoning outcomes for the
same spatial reasoning task. This finding is not predicted by mental model
theory and requires additional hypotheses on the relationship between the
imagery-level and the mental-model-level of the mental model theory.
Without additional adjustments the model of PIT explains both the find-
ings on eye movements and preferences, i.e., the occurrence of eye movements
in the imagery experiment, the lack of eye movements in the mental model
experiment, and the emergence of different reasoning preferences depending
on the addition of (irrelevant) visual details. In PIT, a mental model can
be understood as simply a mental image for which no shape information
1Eye movements were recorded using an eye-tracker.
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is instantiated. Because the instantiation of spatial relations depends on
additional instantiated information, such as shape information, spatial rela-
tions will be instantiated using attention shifts of greater length when shape
information is available (see Section 3.2.2 and Section 5.1.3 for an in-depth
explanation). The employment of attention shifts of greater length leads to
1) more spontaneous eye movements, because attention shifts are executed
overtly when they exceed a certain length, and 2) the generated concrete in-
stance of the imagined situation, i.e., the mental image, is different because
the different attention shifts lead to entities having different locations. The
inference of new spatial relations depends on the locations of the entities.
Therefore, different spatial relations will be inferred, that is, different rea-
soning outcomes will result. Different reasoning outcomes accordingly lead
to different preferences.
Summarizing, without any additional adjustments PIT is able to account
for the results of the study while the mental model theory currently cannot
fully account for the findings. Note that, the above application of PIT to
both the first experiment, i.e., a task commonly considered a mental model
reasoning task, and the second experiment, i.e., a task commonly considered
a visual mental imagery task, indicates that mental model theory and visual
mental imagery could be unified using the framework of PIT.
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